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EDITING NATURE: RECONCEPTUALIZING
BIOTECHNOLOGY GOVERNANCE
JONAS J. MONAST *
Abstract: CRISPR-Cas9 (CRISPR) and other advances in gene editing techniques are fostering a rapid evolution within the field of biotechnology. Scientists can now modify the DNA of living organisms with precision by removing undesirable traits or inserting desirable traits. The edits may impact a single organism or result in genetic alterations that are designed to pass on to offspring (referred to as “gene drives”), potentially altering or eradicating an entire species. Prior to the discovery of the CRISPR gene editing process, the
state of the technology presented barriers to widespread and precise genetic
engineering. CRISPR changes the equation. With fewer technological limits
and the technical and economic accessibility of new gene editing techniques,
society now must grapple with fundamental questions regarding the proper
use of technologies that can reengineer organisms, species, and ecosystems.
The existing approach to biotechnology governance is unprepared to address
these new capabilities, in part because the technology has quickly surpassed
the bounds once thought possible, and in part because the regulatory system is
premised on a narrow set of considerations designed to foster advances in the
field of biotechnology. This Article examines early regulatory oversight of advanced gene editing techniques and identifies important gaps in legal oversight of genetic engineering: a failure of existing laws to cover some CRISPRedited organisms; narrow consideration of ecological impacts; regulators’ inability to consider alternatives; and a failure to assess and respond to competing ideologies. This Article then argues for addressing those gaps by incorporating a natural resource management perspective into biotechnology governance. The article concludes by arguing that biotechnology governance should
incorporate a natural resource management perspective. The scientific advances are new, but the challenges with balancing competing considerations
© 2018, Jonas J. Monast. All rights reserved.
* C. Boyden Gray Distinguished Fellow and Assistant Professor, University of North Carolina School of Law. I am grateful to numerous scholars who offered invaluable feedback throughout
this project, including the participants in the Sabin 2017 Colloquium on Innovative Environmental
Scholarship hosted by the Sabin Center for Climate Change Law at the Columbia Law School, the
Colloquium on Environmental Scholarship at Vermont Law School, the 2017 Wiet Life Sciences
Symposium at the Loyola University Chicago School of Law, and the Southeastern Junior/Senior
Faculty Workshop at the Washington University Law School. The project has also benefitted from
feedback and support from my colleagues at Carolina Law, David Adelman, Alex Klass, and
Maggie Monast. I am especially grateful to Courtney Johnson, who was my research assistant
throughout this project.
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regarding the use and alteration of natural resources are not. Although existing
natural resource laws do not contemplate the ability to reorder ecosystems via
gene editing, there is an established regulatory system designed to address
risks of extinction, accommodate competing ideologies regarding resource
use, and incorporate interests of future generations when considering irreversible decisions regarding natural resources—issues that are all implicated
by gene editing.
[W]ith the newest and arguably most effective genetic engineering tool,
CRISPR-Cas9 (CRISPR for short), the genome—an organism’s entire
DNA content, including all its genes—has become almost as editable as
a simple piece of text. As long as the genetic code for a particular trait
is known, scientists can use CRISPR to insert, edit, or delete the associ1
ated gene in virtually any living plant’s or animal’s genome.
Genetics has provided a paradigm for an entire new vision of human potential, and the potential of nature. 2

INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 2016, Florida residents faced warnings over the Zika
virus, which is transmitted by mosquito bites and tied to birth defects such
as microcephaly. 3 Pregnant women were advised to stay indoors, wear long
sleeves and pants, apply bug spray, and sleep under bed nets to avoid Florida’s ubiquitous mosquitoes. 4 To address this public health crisis, the United
States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved a field test of genetically-modified mosquitoes to control the risk of Zika virus and dengue fever. If successful, the offspring of the modified mosquitoes would die before they could reproduce. To make the judgment about the mosquitoes, the
FDA turned to existing biotechnology rules—a body of law that is not prepared for the latest developments in gene editing technologies. 5
1

JENNIFER A. DOUDNA & SAMUEL H. STERNBERG, A CRACK IN CREATION: GENE EDITING
AND THE UNTHINKABLE POWER TO CONTROL EVOLUTION, at xiii (2017).
2
WORKING GRP. OF THE SOC’Y, RELIGION & TECH. PROJECT, ENGINEERING GENESIS: THE
ETHICS OF GENETIC ENGINEERING IN NON-HUMAN SPECIES 258 (Donald Bruce & Ann Bruce

eds., 2013) (1998).
3
Sammy Mack, Pregnant Women in Miami Take Extra Precautions Against Zika, NAT’L PUB.
RADIO (Aug. 17, 2016), http://www.npr.org/2016/08/17/490314048/pregnant-women-in-miami-takeextra-precautions-against-zika [https://perma.cc/W4VN-3XVQ]; Questions About Zika, CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/zika/about/questions.html [http://perma.cc/
JG2F-CXR4].
4
Mack, supra note 3.
5
See generally FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FINDING OF NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT (FONSI) IN
SUPPORT OF A PROPOSED FIELD TRIAL OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED MALE AEDES AEGYPTI
MOSQUITOES OF THE LINE OX513A IN KEY HAVEN, MONROE COUNTY, FLORIDA UNDER AN
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The field trial was the first FDA-approved release of a geneticallymodified insect and is an early example of a federal agency grappling with
an emerging body of gene editing techniques and the modified organisms
the techniques can produce. 6 The pace of these biotechnology advances is
increasing dramatically thanks to a groundbreaking new development in
gene editing known as “clustered, regularly interspaced, short palindromic
repeats,” or CRISPR-Cas 9 (“CRISPR”). 7 CRISPR and other advances in
genetic engineering give public and private actors the ability to edit the
DNA of living organisms, including human beings, with precision. 8 Scientists may deploy CRISPR to remove undesirable traits or insert desirable
traits. The edits may impact a single organism or result in genetic alterations
designed to pass on to offspring (referred to as “gene drives”), potentially
impacting an entire species. 9
Public policy is only beginning to consider the broad implications of
this new generation of genomic sciences. 10 Governance of CRISPR and
other gene editing techniques relies on various existing laws which are designed to address previous methods of genetic engineering. 11 Safety and
risk management are the dominant lenses through which regulators United
States view questions regarding biotechnology research and commercialization—an approach that is incapable of addressing the fundamental ethical
and moral issues raised by recent advances in gene editing technologies. 12
INVESTIGATIONAL NEW ANIMAL DRUG EXEMPTION (Aug. 5, 2016) (relying in part on the Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of Biotechnology to make its determination).
6
Id.
7
Paul Enriquez, CRISPR GMOs, 18 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 432, 509−10 (2017). CRISPR technology varies from past methods of genetic engineering technology due to its ability to exactly
target a specific DNA site by using the Cas9 protein which allows scientists to either delete or
insert certain DNA at the targeted site. Id. The mosquitoes involved in the proposed Key Haven
field trial were modified using a different method of genetic engineering. See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT FOR INVESTIGATIONAL USE OF AEDES AEGYPTI OX513A,
at 16, 18, 21 (Aug. 5, 2016) [hereinafter FDA MOSQUITO ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT] (noting
that Oxitec’s mosquitoes include a “recombinant DNA (rDNA) construct”).
8
DOUDNA & STERNBERG, supra note 1, at xiii.
9
Gregory E. Kaebnick et al., Precaution and Governance of Emerging Technologies: Precaution Can Be Consistent with Support of Science, 354 SCIENCE 710, 711 (2016).
10
See, e.g., Heidi Ledford, Gene-Edited Cows, Rogue Clinics, Speedier Drug Approvals: The
Challenges Facing Trump’s FDA Chief, 541 NATURE 146, 146–47 (2017) (identifying regulatory
questions facing the Trump administration); Lars Noah, Managing Biotechnology’s (r)evolution:
Has Guarded Enthusiasm Become Benign Neglect?, 11 VA. J. L. & TECH., Spring 2006, at 8–9
(discussing early policy responses to biotechnology developments).
11
See, e.g., Gregory N. Mandel & Gary E. Marchant, The Living Regulatory Challenges of
Synthetic Biology, 100 IOWA L. REV. 155, 173 (2014) (noting that synthetic biology will be subject to “existing environmental and human health protection statutes”).
12
NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., GENE DRIVES ON THE HORIZON: ADVANCING
SCIENCE, NAVIGATING UNCERTAINTY, AND ALIGNING RESEARCH WITH PUBLIC VALUES 63–70
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Policymakers’ responses to the rapidly advancing field of gene editing technologies has the potential to fundamentally alter humans’ relationship with
the natural world. 13
Early regulatory decisions regarding CRISPR and other advanced gene
editing techniques reveal important gaps in legal oversight of genetic engineering. Some of these gaps—such as the limited consideration of ecological impacts, the lack of authority to compare gene editing with alternate
approaches to achieve similar benefits, and the failure to address competing
ideologies—existed prior to the advent of CRISPR but are exacerbated by
the new techniques. Other gaps—primarily instances of gene-edited products escaping regulatory oversight altogether—raise important new questions for the role of public policy in shaping the evolution of emerging genomic sciences. 14
This Article argues that gene editing should be viewed in the context of
resource management. 15 Although CRISPR is new, many of the conflicts
presented by the technology are not. Over the past century-and-a-half, a
broad body of law has evolved to address conflicts regarding ownership of
natural resources, acceptable uses for specific types of resources, environmental impacts of resource and ecosystem alterations, and the balance between resource use, conservation, and preservation. The nation’s multifaceted approach to natural resource management reaches different conclusions
regarding alteration, preservation, and use of specific resources, but collectively natural resource governance grapples with fundamental questions
regarding humans’ relationship with natural systems. To varying degrees,
natural resource statutes require agencies to consider ecological impacts,
economic interests, risk management, interests of future generations, and
(2016) [hereinafter GENE DRIVES ON THE HORIZON]. The genetic engineering debate is not, and
never has been, solely about concerns regarding safety and risk. Genetic engineering is controversial because it challenges existing norms about the proper use of technology and it raises vexing
ethical and ecological concerns about safety, risk, irreversibility, and the disparity between those
who may benefit and those who may be harmed. Id.; Kaebnick et al., supra note 9, at 711.
13
See, e.g., NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, GENOME EDITING: AN ETHICAL REVIEW—A
SHORT GUIDE 4 (2016), http://nuffieldbioethics.org/wp-content/uploads/Genome-editing-an-ethicalreview-short-guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/K7DP-RT9T] (“[G]enome editing could transform not
only the field of biology, but the range of expectations and ambitions about human control over
the biological world.”).
14
NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE PRODUCTS OF
BIOTECHNOLOGY 67–70 (2017) [hereinafter PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE PRODUCTS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY].
15
See infra notes 225–304 and accompanying text. This is not to argue that a natural resource
perspective should supplant other applicable bodies of law. Laws regarding public health, intellectual property, and protection of agricultural products all remain critical pieces of the biotechnology governance system. The central claim in this Article is that these existing laws leave out important considerations that are commonly addressed in the natural resources context.
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evolving societal values. 16 Altering species and ecosystems via CRISPR
raises the same suite of issues, yet there is little overlap between biotechnology governance and the broad body of natural resources law. 17
Not only does the disconnect between biotechnology and natural resource governance create direct conflicts between policy goals, it also fails
to incorporate the values-based considerations that underlie many of the
natural resource statutes. 18 Natural resource management offers models for
addressing the key regulatory gaps presented by gene editing techniques, as
well as models for incorporating a broader set of considerations into the
biotechnology governance framework. 19 A failure to incorporate this broader set of considerations leaves biotechnology governance unprepared to face
the moral, legal, and ecological questions regarding proper use of a technology that can fundamentally alter living organisms and, by extension,
ecosystems and economies. The paper focuses primarily on the governance
of non-human applications, but draws lessons from the more restrictive,
values-based regulatory standards applied to questions of human genome
editing.
Although this Article calls for a conceptual shift toward a natural resource perspective, it does not advocate for a particular normative resolution of gene editing conflicts. Natural resource management is as much
about balancing competing interests as it is about prioritizing a particular
outcome (e.g., managing for conservation or preservation). Instead, the Article offers a new conceptual model for understanding gene editing’s place
within the values-based governance framework that already considers vexing topics such as irreversible changes to living organisms and ecosystems,
interests of future generations, and conflicting viewpoints regarding resource extraction and preservation.
Part I of this Article introduces CRISPR and identifies governance
challenges presented by new gene editing techniques. 20 Part II provides an
overview of the existing approach to biotechnology governance in the United States. 21 Part III explores early examples of federal agencies applying
this approach to organisms that are modified via gene editing techniques
16

See infra notes 47–99 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 100–108 and accompanying text.
18
See PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE PRODUCTS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 14, at 69
box 3-1 (stating that “[v]alues are always embedded in risk analysis by the choices and interpretations of the people conducting them and the selection of risk-assessment endpoints of concern,
methods, and questions”).
19
See infra notes 225–304 and accompanying text.
20
See infra notes 25–46 and accompanying text.
21
See infra notes 47–99 and accompanying text.
17

2018]

Reconceptualizing Biotechnology Governance

2383

and identifies critical gaps in the regulatory system. 22 The focus on whether
a product is altered in a manner that poses a risk to human health, plant and
animal health, or ecosystems fails to address a broader range of ethical concerns and societal values that arise in the gene editing context. A prospective use may be deemed safe, yet it could still raise issues that extend beyond the realm of risk management or scientific expertise.
Part IV turns to natural resource law as a model for expanding the debate beyond a case by case risk management approach to an approach that
addresses competing values regarding the use of gene editing and the ecological impacts of doing so. 23 It concludes by identifying strategies to incorporate a natural resource management approach into the current risk-based regulatory framework. 24 Together, these strategies offer an approach for balancing
conflicting views of gene editing and establishing the equivalent of protected
spaces in the genetic engineering context—circumstances where gene editing
is prohibited or limited on a temporary or permanent basis.
I. NEW CHALLENGES FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY GOVERNANCE
CRISPR opens the door to a vast array of genetic alterations, allowing
scientists to alter humans, plants, animals, and other living organisms by
removing undesirable traits or inserting desirable ones. 25 These edits may
apply to individual organisms through non-heritable edits. 26 The precision
of CRISPR also significantly expands the ability to permanently alter or
eradicate entire species though gene drives—edits to the germline (reproductive) cells that produce heritable traits. 27 Although only a handful of
gene-edited organisms have been approved for release in the United States
and the European Union, numerous releases are likely to occur in the near
future. 28 CRISPR, therefore, presents one of many tests for the Anthropo22

See infra notes 100–224 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 225–304 and accompanying text.
24
See infra notes 225–304 and accompanying text.
25
See generally Jennifer A. Doudna & Emmanuelle Charpentier, The New Frontier of Genome Engineering with CRISPR-Cas9, 346 SCIENCE 1077 (2014); News Release, Nat’l Insts. of
Heath, Researchers Identify Potential Alternative to CRISPR-Cas Genome Editing Tools, (Oct.
22, 2015), https://www.nih.gov/news-events/news-releases/researchers-identify-potential-alternativecrispr-cas-genome-editing-tools [https://perma.cc/C5AA-S4ZM].
26
NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., HUMAN GENOME EDITING: SCIENCE, ETHICS,
AND GOVERNANCE 3 (2017) [hereinafter HUMAN GENOME EDITING].
27
GENE DRIVES ON THE HORIZON, supra note 12, at 156–57.
28
See PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE PRODUCTS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 14, at 41,
172 (explaining the scope of new biotechnology products not currently under U.S. regulatory
power including, “[p]lants that glow, yogurts that harbor biosensors, pigs that develop twice as
much muscle, and microbial communities that may protect honey bees from parasitic mites”).
23
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cene, in which technological advancements allow humans to fundamentally,
and permanently, reshape and dominate natural systems. 29
The new generation of gene editing techniques presents a complex mix
of prospective benefits and complex ethical questions. Gene editing is both
a miraculous scientific breakthrough with the potential to save or improve
human and nonhuman lives and a pathway for creating designer babies and
pets. 30 These techniques simultaneously offer a tool to permanently alter
ecosystems by enhancing some species and driving others to extinction and
create an emerging threat on the scale of weapons of mass destruction that
humanity is not prepared to contain. 31 Casting the technology in the context
29

See Eric Biber, Law in the Anthropocene Epoch, 106 GEO. L.J. 1, 3, 6 (2017) (noting the
Anthropocene Epoch is a proposed new “geological timeframe” denoted by the impact humans
have had on Earth); R. Alta Charo & Henry T. Greely, CRISPR Critters and CRISPR Cracks, 15
AM. J. OF BIOETHICS 11, 15 (2015) (describing the Anthropocene Epoch as a proposed geologic
division characterized by human modification of living things in the world).
30
Antonio Regalado, First Gene-Edited Dogs Reported in China, MIT TECH. R. (Oct. 19, 2015),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/542616/first-gene-edited-dogs-reported-in-china/ [https://perma.
cc/P8FA-3Y4S] [hereinafter Regalado, First Gene Edited Dogs Reported in China]; Antonio Regalado, Engineering the Perfect Baby, MIT TECH. R. (Mar. 5, 2015), https://www.technology
review.com/s/535661/engineering-the-perfect-baby/ [https://perma.cc/J4UG-G7A7]; see Hong Ma
et al., Correction of a Pathogenic Gene Mutation in Human Embryos, 548 NATURE 413, 413
(2017) (reporting on the first successful use of gene editing to repair a disease-causing genetic
mutation); Gina Kolata, Gene Editing Spurs Hope for Transplanting Pig Organs into Humans,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/10/health/gene-editing-pigsorgan-transplants.html [https://perma.cc/L3QF-DPVV] (noting the potential to use gene-editing to
facilitate transplanting pig organs into humans).
31
It is not uncommon for articles in scientific journals and popular press books, websites, and
magazines to describe gene editing and genetic engineering as controlling or altering evolution or
facilitating intentional extinction. See, e.g., DOUDNA & STERNBERG, supra note 1, at xiii (describing capabilities of genomic editing technology); Statement for the Record to the Senate Armed
Servs. Comm., Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, James R. Clapper (Feb. 9, 2016) (stating that “research in genome editing conducted by countries with different
regulatory or ethical standards than those of Western countries probably increases the risk of the
creation of potentially harmful biological agents or products”); see also Juan Enriquez & Steve
Gullans, With Gene Therapy We Could Direct Our Own Evolution, DISCOVER (Mar. 9, 2015),
http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/crux/2015/03/09/gene-therapy-direct-evolution/ [https://perma.
cc/9ZZD-UUKX] (noting the potential for gene editing to allow selective evolution by choosing
“desirable traits” and rejecting “negative traits”); Jens Hegg, Is Intentional Extinction Ever the
Right Thing?, PLOS ECOLOGY COMMUNITY (July 1, 2016), http://blogs.plos.org/ecology/2016/
07/01/is-intentional-extinction-ever-the-right-thing/ [https://perma.cc/EG2J-SD38] (considering
the balance between extinction of one species for the benefit of another); Sean Illing, GeneticallyEngineered Humans Will Arrive Sooner Than You Think. And We’re Not Ready, VOX (Aug. 3,
2017), https://www.vox.com/conversations/2016/10/24/13357298/michael-bess-biotechnology-bio
engineering-technology-revolution-science [https://perma.cc/7ZRH-WH5T] (interviewing historian Michael Bess about the implications of genetically-engineered humans); Antonio Regalado,
The Extinction Invention, MIT TECH. R. (Apr. 13, 2016), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/
601213/the-extinction-invention/ [https://perma.cc/P48C-HJKN] (identifying potential concerns
associated with using gene drive to eliminate certain mosquito populations).
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of designer babies, evolution and extinction, and global threats highlights
the importance of updating the biotechnology regulatory framework to
grapple with the critical value choices inherent in determining how to effectively govern this new form of genetic engineering with such broad applications and potentially profound and irreversible impacts. In the absence of
technological restraints, effective regulatory standards will be critical to
inform professional standards, ethics, and public policy guiding when professional and amateur scientists may alter individual organisms or entire
ecosystems using precision gene editing procedures. 32
Gene editing differs from previous genetic engineering techniques in
significant respects. Unlike previous techniques, CRISPR can achieve genetic alterations by deleting a portion of an organism’s existing DNA without inserting foreign DNA into the organism. 33 This distinction may allow
CRISPR-edited organisms to avoid regulatory triggers that apply to organisms modified via earlier genetic engineering techniques. 34 CRISPR allows
more precise genetic alterations than previous techniques, potentially mitigating concerns about unintended genetic changes resulting from the use of
CRISPR. Perhaps the most important difference is CRISPR’s relative simplicity and low cost. These factors have allowed the technique to spread
quickly to laboratories across the globe, complicating governance efforts
due to the large number of actors and international scope. 35
For example, scientists are altering fruits and vegetables to increase
shelf life in grocery stores. Work is underway to edit crops’ drought tolerance and pest resistance to increase agricultural production. 36 Companies
are experimenting with gene drive techniques to eradicate disease-carrying
insects and insects that harm agricultural crops. 37 Laboratories in China and

32

The existence of conflicting views within the scientific community regarding human
germline editing highlights the need for norms to guide both research and commercialization.
Debates over proper types of research and commercial applications occur primarily within academic journals, often focusing on a single discipline. All the while, research and plans for commercialization continue.
33
Enriquez, supra note 7, at 509–10.
34
Id. at 512–13.
35
See PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE PRODUCTS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 14, at 41
(noting the large number of actors and products resulting from developments in biotechnology);
Doudna & Charpentier, supra note 25, at 1077 (observing that many laboratories “around the
world” are using new biotechnology to develop new applications). This paper does not tackle
questions regarding international governance of CRISPR.
36
GENE DRIVES ON THE HORIZON, supra note 12, at 4; PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE PRODUCTS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 14, at 45–46.
37
GENE DRIVES ON THE HORIZON, supra note 12, at 4, 26; PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE
PRODUCTS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 14, at 48–49.
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the United States have utilized CRISPR to edit human embryos. 38 Other
applications under development include hornless cows, customized dogs,
and a reintroduced prehistoric wooly mammoth. 39 The list could go on. The
genetically-engineered cat is out of the bag.
This is a critical time for reconsidering biotechnology governance. The
current system of biotechnology governance in the United States is primarily designed to address risks to human health and agricultural products.
Laws governing drugs and medical procedures for humans are generally far
more restrictive than laws overseeing plant and animal products, particularly when those products are not intended for human consumption. 40 In in38
HUMAN GENOME EDITING, supra note 26, at 41; Steve Connor, First Human Embryos
Edited in U.S., MIT TECH R. (July 26, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/608350/firsthuman-embryos-edited-in-us/ [https://perma.cc/8ATA-EHQE].
39
See Amy Maxmen, Gene-Edited Animals Face US Regulatory Crackdown, NATURE (Jan. 19,
2017),
http://www.nature.com/news/gene-edited-animals-face-us-regulatory-crackdown-1.21331
[https://perma.cc/B3ZT-5CYW] (describing the creation of hornless dairy cattle “by inserting a gene
from naturally hornless beef cattle into a breed of the same species that is used in milk production”);
Regalado, First Gene Edited Dogs Reported in China, supra note 30 (reporting on the first gene-edited
dogs); Simon Worrall, We Could Resurrect the Woolly Mammoth. Here’s How., NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC
(July 9, 2017), https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2017/07/woolly-mammoths-extinction-cloninggenetics/ [https://perma.cc/3A5K-Y98R] (describing the project to use genetic editing to create a
wooly mammoth).
40
See generally Enriquez, supra note 7, at 499–500 (noting the limitation of the 2017 Update
to Coordinated Framework that, “products posing little to no risk [to human health] ought not to
be subject to onerous regulation”); Jennifer Kuzma & Lindsey Rawls, Engineering the Wild: Gene
Drives and Intergenerational Equity, 56 JURIMETRICS J. 279, 293–94 (2016) (noting that the future consequences of gene drives are unknown and, therefore, could pose risks to future populations); Alison Peck, Re-Framing Biotechnology Regulation, 72 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 314, 317–23
(2017) (noting that new genetic engineering technology has surpassed the scope of the 2017 Update to Coordinated Framework’s regulation). These articles complement a robust body of legal
scholarship regarding governance of biotechnology and genetically-modified organisms (GMOs)
generally. See, e.g., Mary Jane Angelo, Regulating Evolution for Sale: An Evolutionary Biology
Model for Regulating the Unnatural Selection of Genetically Modified Organisms, 42 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 93, 156–65 (2007) (proposing an evolutionary biology model for regulating
GMOs); Carmen G. Gonzalez, Genetically Modified Organisms and Justice: The International
Environmental Justice Implications of Biotechnology, 19 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 583 (2007)
(examining the risks and benefits of GMOs for developing countries). Much of the CRISPRfocused legal scholarship that has been published to date focuses on patent and copyright issues.
See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, A Market Test for Bayh-Dole Patents, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 271, 278 (2017) (describing the dispute over patent rights for CRISPR); Deborah
Ku, The Patentability of the CRISPR-Cas9 Genome Editing Tool, 16 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP.
408, 422–39 (2017) (discussing whether CRISPR technology is a patent-eligible subject matter);
Robin Feldman, The Crispr Revolution: What Editing Human DNA Reveals About the Patent
System’s DNA, 64 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 392, 404–10 (2016), https://www.uclalawreview.
org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Feldman-D64-update.pdf [https://perma.cc/F82V-4TXT] (discussing the tension between the slow-moving U.S. patent system and the rapid innovation of
CRISPR technology); Kristin Beale, Recent Development, The Crispr Patent Battle: Who Will Be
“Cut” Out of Patent Rights to One of the Greatest Scientific Discoveries of Our Generation?,
B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. FORUM, Feb. 9, 2016, at 4–6, http://bciptf.org/wp-content/uploads/
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stances not involving direct human applications, biotechnology governance
is premised on the notion that genetically-engineered products are not inherently dangerous and do not require separate regulatory approaches. 41
Although biotechnology has long faced opposition, the costs, technical
limits, and barriers to entry associated with earlier genetic engineering techniques allowed decisionmakers to avoid grappling with many of the difficult
decisions regarding appropriate and prohibited uses. 42 The range of potential
uses of gene editing, the likely exponential increase in the number of edited
organisms in the near future, and the increasing speed of further technological
innovations will challenge the existing regulatory framework. 43
Rapid advances in the field of gene editing are now forcing the unresolved issues, and in the process raising complex moral, ethical, and ecological questions. 44 For example, the same process for eradicating diseasecarrying insects could also apply to insects that are considered nuisances to
humans or animals but are not disease vectors. Should regulatory approaches differ depending on the type of gene editing applications, such as distinctions between those that address critical societal needs and those that allow
discretionary alterations for mere convenience, comfort, cost reduction, or
aesthetic preferences? 45 Furthermore, how will gene editing to eradicate
2016/02/KBeale-CRISPR.pdf [https://perma.cc/R64A-TBML] (describing patent issues surrounding CRISPR).
41
See generally Modernizing the Regulatory System for Biotechnology Products: Final Version
of the 2017 Update to the Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of Biotechnology, Exec. Office
of the President (Jan. 4, 2017) [hereinafter 2017 Update to Coordinated Framework] (summarizing
that governance decisions do not turn on the fact that scientists engineered the change, or the potential evolutionary impacts of the genetic changes).
42
See GENE DRIVES ON THE HORIZON, supra note 12, at 64 (stating that “[g]enetic engineering sparked ethical debate as soon as it was imagined”).
43
PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE PRODUCTS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 14, at 27 (noting
that “[i]ncreasing investment in the bioeconomy, complex societal challenges, the confluence of
new technical drivers, and a proliferation of new actors are transforming both biotechnology products and the context in which the U.S. regulatory system operates”). Another recent National
Academy report predicts calls for rapid release of gene-edited organisms to address, “crisis situations,
before there is adequate knowledge of their ecological effects, and before mitigation plans for unintended consequences are in place.” GENE DRIVES ON THE HORIZON, supra note 12, at 1; see Jay
Bennett, 11 Crazy Gene-Hacking Things We Can Do with CRISPR, POPULAR MECHANICS (Jan. 26,
2016), http://www.popularmechanics.com/science/a19067/11-crazy-things-we-can-do-with-crisprcas9/ [https://perma.cc/Q9WH-SBBU] (listing potential uses for CRISPR); Kristopher Grunert,
Backyard Gene Editing Risks Creating a Monster, NEW SCIENTIST (Mar. 15, 2017), https://www.
newscientist.com/article/mg23331173-400-backyard-gene-editing-risks-creating-a-monster/ [https://
perma.cc/9AYS-4VJ7] (noting the risks of unregulated use of CRISPR).
44
PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE PRODUCTS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 14, at 27;
Grunert, supra note 43; see GENE DRIVES ON THE HORIZON, supra note 12, at 1 (noting that
“[g]enetic engineering sparked ethical debate as soon as it was imagined”).
45
See Bruce L. Webber et al., Opinion: Is CRISPR-Based Gene Drive a Biocontrol Silver
Bullet or Global Conservation Threat?, 112 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS. 10,565,
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species interact with statutes regarding conservation and species preservation? Should public policy restrict gene editing if other conventional techniques are available to achieve the same result? Should policymakers consider new regulatory measures that account for a broader array of societal
values implicated by gene editing techniques? Perhaps most fundamentally,
who makes these decisions and to what degree do they need to engage affected stakeholders?
The widespread availability of the technology may create particular
governance challenges, as numerous laboratories are able to experiment
with engineering similar organisms, potentially resulting in multiple new
species enhanced with different characteristics aimed at accomplishing different goals. 46 These new capabilities shine light on the direct role of human
decision making in guiding the trajectory of species and ecosystems. The
direct links to, and occasional conflicts with, existing environmental and
natural resource regulatory schemes call for a more robust system of governance that oversees the use of CRISPR.
II. THE EXISTING BIOTECHNOLOGY GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK
The existing system of biotechnology governance is unprepared to adequately answer the questions posed by gene editing, in part because the
technology has quickly surpassed the bounds once thought possible, and in
part because the regulatory system is premised on a narrow set of considerations designed to foster advances in the field of biotechnology while managing prospective risks. Early regulatory responses to proposals for releasing genetically-engineered organisms indicate how the current biotechnology governance system will apply to the upcoming wave of gene editing applications. This section provides an overview of the existing framework for
biotechnology governance in the United States, analyzes case studies applying this framework to the recent advancements in genetic engineering, and
identifies regulatory gaps exposed by these case studies. 47
The Reagan Administration established the Coordinated Framework
for Regulation of Biotechnology (“Coordinated Framework”) in 1986 to
clarify agency roles under existing law, streamline agency collaboration,
10,565 (Aug. 25, 2015) (stating that “[t]he question is no longer whether we can control invasive
species using gene drive, but whether we should”).
46
See David Baltimore et al., A Prudent Path Forward for Genomic Engineering and
Germline Gene Modification, 348 SCIENCE 36, 36 (Apr. 3, 2015) (stating that “[t]he simplicity of
the CRISPR-Cas9 system allows any researcher with knowledge of molecular biology to modify
genomes, making feasible experiments that were previously difficult or impossible to conduct”).
47
See infra notes 48–99 and accompanying text.
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and avoid overlapping regulations. 48 Two key decisions provide the foundation for the Coordinated Framework. First, the Reagan Administration prioritized safety and risk, primarily to human health and agriculture, when
evaluating the use of genetic engineering. 49 Second, government officials
concluded that biotechnology is not “inherently risky,” and thus opted to
evaluate the safety and risk of individual genetically-altered products on a
case-by-case basis. 50 Governance decisions do not turn on the fact that scientists engineered the change, or the potential evolutionary impacts of the
genetic changes. 51 These conclusions supported reliance on existing law to
oversee biotechnology products. 52 The Coordinated Framework continues
to define the United States approach to biotechnology governance. The decision to prioritize risk management over other concerns and the focus on
products (in other words, the organism and any risks it may pose) rather
than the fact that the organism was genetically-modified remain sources of
conflict in debates regarding genetic engineering. 53
The Obama Administration’s 2017 Update to the Coordinated Framework reiterates the view that the product-specific, risk-based approach adequately addresses both health and environmental risks of biotechnology
products. 54 Rather than suggesting revisions to the regulatory system, the
update focuses on increasing transparency, clarifying agency authority, and
reducing regulatory hurdles. 55 The update “describes the types of biotechnology product areas regulated by the various components within each primary
regulatory agency (i.e., EPA, FDA, or USDA)” and outlines each agency’s
responsibility when a particular type of product falls within the scope of
48

See generally Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg.
23,302 (June 26, 1986) [hereinafter Coordinated Framework].
49
See, e.g., id. at 23,303 (requiring that regulatory reviews deem a new product to be safe
before it can be commercialized).
50
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, GENETICALLY MODIFIED PEST-PROTECTED PLANTS: SCIENCE
AND REGULATION 25 (2000) [hereinafter GM PEST-PROTECTED PLANTS]. For example, the FDA
considers development of new plant varieties as a “continuum” that includes selective breeding
and genetic engineering. Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed.
Reg. 22, 984, 22,985–86 (May 29, 1991). The obligation to ensure that new food products are safe
applies anywhere along that continuum. Id. at 22,985.
51
57 Fed. Reg. at 22,985–86.
52
See Coordinated Framework, supra note 48, at 23,303 (stating that existing laws are sufficient to regulate most new biotechnology).
53
Jennifer Kuzma et al., Evaluating Oversight Systems for Emerging Technologies: A Case
Study of Genetically Engineered Organisms, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 546, 549 (2009); see GENE
DRIVES ON THE HORIZON, supra note 12, at 1 (noting that “[g]enetic engineering sparked ethical
debate as soon as it was imagined”); Grunert, supra note 43 (noting the risks of unregulated use of
CRISPR).
54
2017 Update to Coordinated Framework, supra note 41, at 5.
55
Id. at 2, 5.
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more than one agency. 56 The update also clarifies the timeline of review to
minimize delays and support innovation, by “discuss[ing] provisions for
future review of the Coordinated Framework.” 57
The 2017 Update to the Coordinated Framework includes hypothetical
biotechnology products to demonstrate how the regulatory system might
apply. 58 Notably, the hypotheticals do not specify examples of products developed via gene editing technologies despite the growing prevalence of
CRISPR during the 18-month process of producing the update. 59 The hypotheticals also fail to provide clear guidance regarding when a product triggers collaboration among the three agencies, or which agency takes the lead
in initiating the collaborations. 60
The National Strategy for Modernizing the Regulatory System for Biotechnology Products (“National Strategy”), released in 2016, complements
the update to the Coordinated Framework by “develop[ing] a long-term
strategy to ensure that the Federal regulatory system is equipped to efficiently assess the risks, if any, of the future products of biotechnology.”61
Like the 2017 Update to the Coordinated Framework, the National Strategy
does not specifically address new risks raised by CRISPR and other recent
advancements in biotechnology. 62 Instead, the report identifies general options for future actions ranging from holding stakeholder meetings to “explor[ing] mechanisms to enhance coordination” among the agencies. 63
The FDA, Department of Agriculture (USDA), and Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) have primary responsibility for biotechnology
governance, applying existing statutes to perform product-specific riskbased assessments. Whether a genetically-engineered product falls within
an agency’s respective jurisdiction depends on the type of organism, how
the genetic modification occurred and the intended uses of the modified
product. The FDA considers whether a genetically-altered plant, animal, or
other organism poses a health risk to humans or animals. The FDA also
oversees gene therapy and human genome editing, applying higher levels of
56
Id. at 2. When necessary, the agencies are to form ad hoc working groups potentially including members outside the three agencies for additional expertise. Id. at 36. The update provides
examples to provide specific, non-binding mechanisms to guide agency collaboration. Id. at 37–
38.
57
Id. at 2.
58
Id. at 39–51.
59
The Executive Office of the President launched the update process on July 2, 2015. Id. at 1.
60
Id. at 36, 39.
61
NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR MODERNIZING THE REGULATORY
SYSTEM FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY PRODUCTS 4 (Sept. 2016), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/
files/2016-12/documents/biotech_national_strategy_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/YM79-7GQT].
62
See generally id.
63
Id. at 12, 19.
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scrutiny to gene editing intended for direct human applications. 64 The
USDA focuses on potential harm to agricultural plants and animals. The
EPA regulates new genetically-engineered products if they meet the definition of a pesticide or produce “new chemical substances” that are not otherwise regulated by the FDA or USDA. The following subsections provide
an overview of each agency’s role in biotechnology governance and recent
developments to address advances in gene editing.
A. FDA Oversight
The FDA oversees three primary categories of genetically-engineered
products: (1) human drugs and medical products, (2) animal drugs, and (3)
foods derived from plants. 65 The applicable laws generally require premarket approval of drugs, biological products, medical devices, food additives, and dietary supplements. 66
Consistent with the Coordinated Framework’s focus on the characteristics of a product rather than the biotechnology process used to develop the
product, the FDA evaluates the safety and effectiveness of covered products
regardless of the technique used to produce the products. 67 Recognizing
64

There is a ban on federal funding for human genome editing. Consolidated Appropriations Act
of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114−113, 129 Stat. 2242, 749 (adopted Dec. 18, 2015) (banning federal funding
of “research in which a human embryo is intentionally created or modified to include a heritable
genetic modification”); Francis S. Collins, Dir. of Nat’l Insts. of Health, Statement on NIH Funding
of Research Using Gene-Editing Technologies in Human Embryos, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH (Apr.
28, 2015), https://www.nih.gov/about-nih/who-we-are/nih-director/statements/statement-nih-fundingresearch-using-gene-editing-technologies-human-embryos [https://perma.cc/3B3B-34G2].
65
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act focuses on food safety and the safety and effectiveness of human and animal drugs. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717,
52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2018)); 2017 Update to Coordinated Framework, supra note 41, at 9 tbl.1. The Public Health Service Act governs the safety of
biological products developed for “the prevention, treatment, or cure of diseases or injuries of
man,” including but not limited to viruses, vaccines, and blood. Public Health Service Act, Pub. L.
No. 78-410, 58 Stat. 682 (1944) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 262 (2018)). The FDA may
also regulate biotechnology products involving cosmetics, foods and food additives, dietary supplements, tobacco products, new animal drugs, and drugs and devices. What Does FDA Regulate?,
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. https://www.fda.gov/aboutfda/transparency/basics/ucm194879.htm [https://
perma.cc/F8T4-AKDY]. The FDA also addresses other angles of biotechnology—for example,
valid nutritional and health claims. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C §§ 301, 341, 348, 350–364, 387a (2018)
(stating the FDA’s authority to regulate various biotechnology products).
66
Food additives do not require pre-market approval if they are classified as “generally recognized as safe” for their intended uses. 21 U.S.C. § 321(s).
67
For example, the FDA’s method to evaluate “foods derived from new plant varieties, includ[es] those developed by recombinant DNA (rDNA) techniques.” Robert M. Califf & Ritu Nalubola, FDA’s Science-based Approach to Genome Edited Products, FDA VOICE (Jan. 18, 2017),
https://blogs.fda.gov/fdavoice/index.php/2017/01/fdas-science-based-approach-to-genome-editedproducts/ [https://perma.cc/PE6V-L67Q]. The FDA’s regulation of biological products includes
products produced via gene editing. Id.
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uncertainties regarding approval of biotechnology products, the agency established a voluntary pre-market consultation process for foods derived
from genetically-engineered products. 68 The FDA has yet to complete a
consultation for foods derived from a plant produced from gene editing. 69
Of the three agencies with primary oversight of biotechnology products,
the FDA has been the most active in updating regulations to address advances
in gene editing. 70 The agency released two draft guidance documents in early
2017 aimed at updating its approach to genetically-engineered animals and
mosquito-related products, and requested comments regarding regulation of
gene editing in plants. 71 As discussed below, these steps would expand the
definition of “animal drug” to subject gene editing of animals to additional
regulatory review. 72
B. USDA Oversight
The USDA’s role in biotechnology governance is rooted in its authority to control animal and plant pests pursuant to the Animal Health Protection Act (“AHPA”) and Plant Protection Act (“PPA”). 73 The AHPA requires
the USDA to prohibit or restrict the importation into the United States and
transportation across state lines of any pests or disease-causing organisms in
68

Consultation Procedures Under FDA’s 1992 Statement of Policy—Foods Derived from
New Plant Varieties, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (revised Oct. 1997), https://www.fda.gov/Food/
GuidanceRegulation/GuidanceDocumentsRegulatoryInformation/Biotechnology/ucm096126.htm
[https://perma.cc/CF47-CAUA] [hereinafter 1992 Consultation Procedures]; see Biotechnology
Consultations on Food from GE Plant Varieties, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.accessdata.
fda.gov/scripts/fdcc/?set=Biocon [https://perma.cc/5JBZ-NXFM] (listing records of biotechnology
consultations that used the FDA’s 1992 consultation procedures).
69
See 1992 Consultation Procedures, supra note 68 (detailing the process that developers of
biotechnology products may use to consult with the FDA prior to market release).
70
Q&A on FDA Regulation of Intentionally Altered Genomic DNA in Animals, FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/animalveterinary/developmentapprovalprocess/geneticengineering/
geneticallyengineeredanimals/ucm113605.htm [https://perma.cc/HRD4-YRB2].
71
See generally FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CLARIFICATION OF FDA AND EPA JURISDICTION
OVER MOSQUITO-RELATED PRODUCTS: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY (Oct. 2017), https://www.fda.
gov/downloads/AnimalVeterinary/GuidanceComplianceEnforcement/GuidanceforIndustry/UCM5
33600.pdf [https://perma.cc/D6EA-CVQH] [hereinafter FDA MOSQUITO DRAFT GUIDANCE];
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: REGULATION OF INTENTIONALLY ALTERED
GENOMIC DNA IN ANIMALS, DRAFT GUIDANCE (Jan. 2017), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/
AnimalVeterinary/GuidanceComplianceEnforcement/GuidanceforIndustry/UCM113903.pdf [https://
perma.cc/C6H4-MFSU] [hereinafter FDA GE ANIMALS DRAFT GUIDANCE]; FDA Requests
Comments on Documents Related to Certain Biotechnology and Mosquito-related Products, FOOD
& DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/AnimalVeterinary/NewsEvents/CVMUpdates/ucm536949.
htm [https://perma.cc/PB48-YKG7].
72
FDA GE ANIMALS DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 71, at 4−7.
73
Plant Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 7701–7786 (2018); Animal Health Protection Act, 7
U.S.C. §§ 8301–8322 (2018).
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livestock populations, including animals that may present a risk of transmitting such pests or diseases. 74 The agency conducts an animal health risk
assessment to determine if genetically-engineered animals present a risk to
livestock health. 75 If so, the genetically-engineered organism is subject to
import or transport restrictions. 76 Genetically-engineered insects may also
fall under AHPA provisions if there is a risk they could spread livestock diseases. 77 The PPA requires the USDA to control plant pests and noxious
weeds. 78 Importantly for gene editing governance, PPA regulations presume
that genetically-engineered organisms include foreign DNA—a characteristic of earlier genetic engineering techniques. 79 Other genetically-engineered
organisms may also be subject to regulation if they are unclassified under
the PPA, the classification is unknown, or they “contain[] such an organism,
or any other organism or product altered or produced through genetic engineering which the [USDA] Administrator, determines is a plant pest or has
reason to believe is a plant pest.” 80 If a genetically-engineered organism is
subject to PPA regulations, the USDA requires notification prior to the importation, interstate transport, or release of a covered plant pest or noxious
weed. 81 Entities may petition for an exemption by demonstrating that the
product is not a plant pest. 82

74

7 U.S.C. §§ 8303, 8305.
See id. § 8303.
76
Id.; 7 C.F.R. § 340.0 (2018).
77
7 U.S.C. § 8302 (13).
78
7 U.S.C. § 7701 (2018). Statutory definitions of “plant pest” and “noxious weed” are quite
broad. See id. §§ 7702 (10) (defining a “noxious weed” as “any plant or plant product that can
directly or indirectly injure or cause damage to crops (including nursery stock or plant products),
livestock, poultry, or other interests of agriculture, irrigation, navigation, the natural resources of
the United States, the public health, or the environment”), 7702 (14) (defining “plant pest” as “any
living state of any of the following that can directly or indirectly injure, cause damage to, or cause
disease in any plant or plant product: (A) a protozoan; (B) a nonhuman animal; (C) a parasitic
plant; (D) a bacterium; (E) a fungus; (F) a virus or viroid; (G) an infectious agent or other pathogen; (H) any article similar to or allied with any of the articles specified in the preceding subparagraphs”).
79
See 7 C.F.R. § 340.1 (defining a “regulated article” as “[a]ny organism which has been
altered or produced through genetic engineering, if the donor organism, recipient organism, or
vector or vector agent belongs to any genera or taxa designated in § 340.2 and meets the definition
of plant pest”).
80
Id.
81
Id. § 340.0.
82
Importation, Interstate Movement, and Environmental Release of Certain Genetically Engineered Organisms, 82 Fed. Reg. 7008, 7016 (Jan. 19, 2017) [hereinafter Import and Release of GE
Organisms].
75
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In January 2017, the USDA proposed new PPA regulations to adapt to
advances in the field of biotechnology. 83 If approved, this would be the first
comprehensive revision of the regulations since they were established in
1987. 84 Under the proposed rule, the USDA would make an initial determination whether a genetically-engineered organism poses a plant pest or noxious weed risk rather than impose permitting requirements and allow entities to petition for exemptions. 85 The proposal maintains the focus on genetically-engineered products rather than the process; therefore, only those
products that pose a plant risk or noxious weed risk would be subject to
regulation. 86
C. EPA Oversight
The EPA’s role in biotechnology governance focuses primarily on pesticides and toxic materials. The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”) requires the agency to regulate “the distribution, sale,
or use in any State of any pesticide that is not registered . . . .” 87 Pesticides
include “any substance or mixture of substances intended for preventing,
destroying, repelling, or mitigating any pest, . . . [or] intended for use as a
plant regulator, defoliant, or desiccant, [or] nitrogen stabilizer . . . .” 88 The
EPA must determine that the pesticide in question presents no “unreasonable adverse effects on the environment” prior to its sale or distribution. 89
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”) tasks the EPA
with establishing the amount of pesticide chemical residues that may be
present in food and to “determine[] that there is a reasonable certainty that
83
See generally APHIS, QUESTIONS & ANSWERS: APHIS REQUESTS PUBLIC INPUT ON NEXT
STEPS TOWARDS REVISION OF ITS BIOTECHNOLOGY REGULATIONS (Jan. 2017), https://www.aphis.
usda.gov/biotechnology/downloads/340/q&a_biotech-reg-revisions.pdf [https://perma.cc/RTH8K7CA] [hereinafter APHIS Q&A].
84
Id. In 2008, APHIS proposed a multi-tiered permit system and a significant expansion of
agency regulatory authority revisions. Import and Release of GE Organisms, supra note 82, at
7011. The proposed revisions were rejected due to a lack of detail regarding which organisms
would fall under regulatory control. Id. The failure of that proposal informed the revisions included in the current proposal. Id. at 7011–12.
85
APHIS Q&A, supra note 83.
86
Id.
87
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136a (2018).
88
Id. § 136(u).
89
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) and Federal Facilities, ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/federal-insecticide-fungicide-and-rodenticideact-fifra-and-federal-facilities#Summary [https://perma.cc/TX56-9QRK]. Unreasonable adverse
effects may include: (1) products that cause unreasonable risk to humans or the environment and
(2) “a human dietary risk from residues that result from the use of a pesticide in or on any food
inconsistent with the standard under section 346a of title 21.” 7 U.S.C. § 136(bb).
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no harm will result from aggregate exposure to the pesticide chemical residue, including all anticipated dietary exposures and all other exposures for
which there is reliable information.” 90 The tolerance levels set by the EPA
apply to both domestic and imported foods. 91 The EPA has the ability to
alter either the tolerance or tolerance exemption levels, and the FDA must
follow the levels set by the EPA. 92
The EPA also regulates certain biotechnology products pursuant to the
Toxic Substances Control Act (“TSCA”). 93 For example, the TSCA applies
to plant-incorporated protectants (“PIPs”), genetically-modified microbial
pesticides, herbicide tolerant crops, and intergeneric microorganisms. 94 Although some plants naturally produce defenses against pests, these TSCAregulated organisms are modified to “express[] pesticidal properties by producing a bacterial protein that will protect the plants from specific insects.” 95 In the case of herbicide-tolerant crops, the EPA regulates the herbicide even though the plant falls under USDA jurisdiction and the FDA is
responsible for regulating the food produced from the plant. 96 The EPA sets
the tolerance levels for the herbicide, ensuring that the levels comply with
the legal limits of pesticide residue. 97
Although the 2016 amendments to TSCA do not specifically pertain to
biotechnology, the law requires alterations in the review process that require
“an affirmative finding on the safety of new chemical substances . . . before
they are allowed into the marketplace.” 98 This finding includes populations
90

21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2018).
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Chapter 11—Tolerance Petitions, in PESTICIDE REGISTRATION MANUAL, https://www.epa.gov/pesticide-registration/pesticide-registration-manual-chapter-11-tolerancepetitions#main-content [https://perma.cc/H4QM-5YLU].
92
21 U.S.C. § 346a.
93
Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2629 (2018). The TSCA aims to “[p]revent the manufacture, processing, distribution in commerce, use, or disposal of chemical substances, or any combination of such activities with such substances, from presenting an unreasonable
risk to potentially exposed or susceptible population, without consideration of costs or other nonrisk factors.” 2017 Update to Coordinated Framework, supra note 41, at 9.
94
2017 Update to Coordinated Framework, supra note 41, at 13. Intergeneric organisms are
“[m]icroorganisms formed by the deliberate combination of genetic material from organisms classified in different taxonomic genera, including microorganisms constructed with synthetic genes
not identical to DNA that would be derived from the same genus as the recipient . . . .” Id.
95
EPA’s Regulation of Biotechnology for Use in Pest Management, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/regulation-biotechnology-under-tsca-and-fifra/epas-regulation-biotechnologyuse-pest-management [https://perma.cc/RLS6-MHJP].
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
2017 Update to Coordinated Framework, supra note 41, at 14; Regulatory Determinations
Made Under Section 5 of the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://
www.epa.gov/reviewing-new-chemicals-under-toxic-substances-control-act-tsca/regulatory-determ
inations-made-under [https://perma.cc/N23K-5NP5].
91
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that may be affected other than the one intended. 99 Unlike the FDA and
USDA, the EPA has not proposed any updates to its biotechnology regulatory framework to address new gene editing technologies.
III. GAPS IN GENE EDITING GOVERNANCE
A 2017 National Academy of Sciences study, produced at the request
of the White House Office of Science and Technology, considered the future
of biotechnology as part of the process for updating the Coordinated
Framework. 100 The study identified additional regulatory gaps and resource
needs. 101 For example, the report concludes that the FDA, the USDA, and
the EPA “lack the expertise and resources to effectively address the rise in
biotechnology products.” 102 The report recommends a single entry point for
categories of genetically-engineered products to better streamline and identify circumstances that require more complex risk assessments. 103 Additionally, the report raises concerns regarding new types of biotechnology products not previously encountered, such as toys or pets, and suggests that
newer products require a completely new approach to risk analysis because
they will be so different from those that currently exist. 104 The study also
notes that “[existing] statutes may not empower regulators to require product developers to share in the burden of generating information about product safety . . . .” 105
These issues remain unaddressed. For example, the FDA’s draft guidance concerning genetically-engineered mosquitoes seeks to clarify the circumstances under which the FDA or EPA would act as the lead agency in
the future. The guidance proposes that the FDA would oversee “products
that limit disease transmission or modify mosquitoes in non-lethal ways.” 106
The FDA argues that products engineered to reduce the size of a mosquito
population should be considered pesticides rather than a new animal drug,

99
See 2017 Update to Coordinated Framework, supra note 41, at 13 (noting the consideration of “potentially exposed or susceptible population[s]”).
100
PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE PRODUCTS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 14, at 67–70.
101
Id. at 98–102.
102
2017 Update to Coordinated Framework, supra note 41, at 5–6.
103
Id. at 9−10.
104
Id. at 11.
105
Id. at 173.
106
Jack Karsten & Darrell M. West, New Biotech Regulations Require Balance of Safety and
Innovation, BROOKINGS: TECHTANK (Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/
2017/03/03/new-biotech-regulations-require-balance-of-safety-and-innovation/ [https://perma.cc/
M6PA-RWAV]; see FDA MOSQUITO DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 71, at 5 (differentiating between FDA regulation of new animal drugs and EPA regulation of pesticide products).
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thereby falling under the EPA’s jurisdiction pursuant to the FIFRA. 107 Although the goal of the document is to separate unnecessary overlap between
the EPA and the FDA, it identifies some situations when the FDA may consult with the EPA. 108 As of the publication of this Article, the EPA has not
weighed in on the question. Unless the proposed guidance receives final
approval, releases of gene-edited insects and animals will continue to fall
within the FDA’s jurisdiction if the modified organism could directly impact
human health.
Early examples of agencies applying existing law to gene-edited organisms expose four additional regulatory gaps that extend beyond those
identified by the National Academy report. The first, a gap in regulatory
oversight, is exposed by the recent advances in gene editing. The remaining
three—minimal consideration of ecological impacts, regulators’ inability to
consider alternatives, and a failure to assess and respond to competing ideologies—have been evident for quite some time but are exacerbated by the
accessibility and far-reaching impacts of CRISPR. These gaps demonstrate
that the deficiencies in biotechnology governance require more than additional resources, expertise, and coordination. Instead, addressing these issues requires rethinking the nation’s approach to biotechnology governance
and the goals and values that guide agencies as they evaluate the next wave
of genetically-modified organisms.
A. Regulatory Oversight
Despite recent efforts to update and enhance the coordination among
the relevant agencies, some gene-edited products fall outside the scope of
existing regulation. 109 Deleting an organism’s own genes, rather than inserting foreign DNA, may alter the species and potentially its ecosystem, but it
may not increase the direct risks the organism poses to human or animal
health. 110 Choosing not to regulate certain products may be appropriate. As
107
FDA MOSQUITO DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 71, at 5–6; see Karsten & West, supra
note 106 (noting a proposal that would give the EPA authority over genetically-engineered products that limit or eliminate mosquitos and the FDA authority over products that inhibit mosquitoborne diseases or alter mosquitoes without complete elimination).
108
FDA MOSQUITO DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 71, at 6.
109
FDA GE ANIMALS DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 71, at 6, 8–9; Maxmen, supra note 39;
see Jennifer Kuzma, Reboot the Debate on Genetic Engineering, 531 NATURE 165, 166 (2016),
(noting that approximately twenty genetically-engineered plants have escaped USDA regulatory
review since 2011).
110
See Import and Release of GE Organisms, supra note 82, at 7015−16 (stating that new
genetic-engineering techniques that delete an organism’s own genes simply speed up results of
ordinary breeding, and therefore the risk is comparable to ordinary breeding, thus finding no inherent increased risks).
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it stands, however, that choice occurs by default because drafters of existing
laws and regulations did not imagine the new options for editing genes—
hardly an appropriate rationale for declining to govern a new technology
with potentially profound cultural, economic, and ecological implications.
1. Mushrooms and Corn
In April 2016, the USDA determined that a CRISPR-edited white button mushroom modified to reduce browning and a variety of waxy corn
that increases the starch content in the kernels are not subject to review by
the agency. These were the USDA’s first considerations of agricultural
products edited via CRISPR. 111 In both cases, the USDA’s Animal and Plant
Health Inspection Service (“APHIS”) concluded that there is “no reason to
believe” that CRISPR-edited white button mushrooms or waxy corn are
plant pests as defined by the PPA. 112 Neither product triggered EPA regulation because they did not produce pesticides or toxic materials. 113 The FDA
did not have jurisdiction over the crop itself, but can oversee the product at
a later date if the developer decides to bring the mushroom to market. 114
The gene-edited white button mushroom and waxy corn join a growing
number of genetically-engineered agricultural products considered nonregulated articles under the USDA regulations, highlighting how recent
technologies are beginning to fall outside the scope of the USDA’s product-

111

Letter from Michael J. Firko, Deputy Director, APHIS, to Dr. Daria H. Schmidt (Apr. 18,
2016), https://www.aphis.usda.gov/biotechnology/downloads/reg_loi/15-352-01_air_response_signed.
pdf [https://perma.cc/4ALR-WMKQ] [hereinafter USDA Waxy Corn Letter]; Letter from Michael
J. Firko, Deputy Director, APHIS, to Dr. Yinong Yang (Apr. 13, 2016), (https://www.aphis.usda.gov/
biotechnology/downloads/reg_loi/15-321-01_air_response_signed.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D2PXXLH9] [hereinafter USDA White Button Mushroom Letter]; see Emily Waltz, CRISPR-Edited
Crops Free to Enter Market, Skip Regulation, 34 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 582, 582 (2016)
(stating that “[t]he first CRISPR-edited crops presented to the US regulatory system can be cultivated
and sold without oversight by the [USDA]”). The USDA subsequently announced that it would not
regulate gene-edited crops “that could otherwise have been developed through traditional breeding
techniques as long as they are developed without the use of a plant pest as the donor or vector and
they are not themselves plant pests.” Details on USDA Plant Breeding Innovations, U.S. DEP’T
AGRIC. (June 14, 2018), https://www.aphis.usda.gov/aphis/ourfocus/biotechnology/brs-news-andinformation/2018_brs_news/pbi-details [https://perma.cc/CT5W-QDHV].
112
USDA Waxy Corn Letter, supra note 111, at 2; USDA White Button Mushroom Letter,
supra note 111, at 2; cf. Plant Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. § 7702 (14) (2018) (defining plant pests).
113
See USDA Waxy Corn Letter, supra note 111, at 2 (noting that the engineered corn is not
subject to regulation under 7 C.F.R. § 340); USDA White Button Mushroom Letter, supra note
111, at 2 (noting that the engineered mushroom is not subject to regulation under 7 C.F.R. § 340).
114
See 21 U.S.C. §§ 342(a)(1), 348 (2018) (stating that substances that are not added to food
are not considered “adulterated” if they are not harmful to health and, therefore, not subject to
FDA regulation).
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based regulations. 115 APHIS’s reasoning regarding CRISPR could lead to a
growing class of genetically-engineered food products that falls outside
USDA jurisdiction. 116
2. The Hornless Cow
A gene-edited hornless cow may provide the next test of the biotechnology governance system. The genetic modification to create hornless
dairy cows, which the developers promote as improving animal welfare and
farmer safety, inserts a gene from an existing breed of hornless beef cattle
into a breed of dairy cattle. 117 Recombinetics, Inc., the firm seeking to market the hornless cows, bases its arguments on a selective breeding analogy
for gene editing. 118 Proponents of this viewpoint argue that editing an organism’s genetic code by removing or altering specific strands of DNA is
simply speeding up the selective breeding process farmers have used for
thousands of years; in other words, there is nothing harmful about the process. 119 Furthermore, because selective breeding is perfectly legal, new
techniques that achieve the same result should be legal as well.
115
Emily Waltz, Gene-Edited CRISPR Mushroom Escapes US Regulation, 532 NATURE 293,
293 (2016). For example, the USDA approved a genetically-engineered potato that reduces
browning and bruising. Determination of Nonregulated Status of Genetically Engineered Potato,
80 Fed. Reg. 53,101, 53,101 (Sept. 2, 2015). Unlike traditional genetically-modified crops, however, this technique only contains a trace of foreign DNA—a key trigger for USDA regulation.
DEP’T OF AGRIC., NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT DECISION AND FINDING OF NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT: X17 AND Y9 POTATOES WITH LATE BLIGHT RESISTANCE, LOW ACRYLAMIDE
POTENTIAL, LOWERED REDUCED SUGARS, AND REDUCED BLACK SPOT (16-064-01p), at 5 (Oct.
28, 2016). The agency has also approved an apple designed to resist browning using a similar
technique. Preliminary Determination for an Extension of a Determination of Nonregulated Status
for Non-Browning Artic Apple Event NF872 Apple, 81 Fed. Reg. 53,396, 53,396 (Aug. 12, 2016).
116
See USDA Waxy Corn Letter, supra note 111, at 2 (stating that “given the speed, ease, and
wide use of CRISPR gene-editing, many other crops are sure to follow [the CRISPR-edited waxy
corn]”); Melody M. Bomgardner, CRISPR: A New Toolbox for Better Crops, 95 CHEM. & ENG’G
NEWS 30, 30–34 (2017) (noting that “questions persist” regarding regulation and that the USDA
commented that “it does not have the authority to regulate” plants that do not contain certain geneedited plants that “do not contain foreign genes”).
117
PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE PRODUCTS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 14, at 45;
DEP’T OF AGRICULTURE RESEARCH, EDUC., & INFO. SYS., IMPROVEMENT OF DIARY ANIMAL
WELL-BEING BY GENETIC DEHORNING, https://portal.nifa.usda.gov/web/crisprojectpages/1005738improvement-of-diary-animal-well-being-by-genetic-dehorning.html [https://perma.cc/2XL2-YSSY]
[hereinafter DAIRY ANIMAL WELL-BEING]. The dehorning method utilizes a gene editing technique referred to as “transcription activator-like effector nucleases” rather than CRISPR. DAIRY
ANIMAL WELL-BEING, supra.
118
DAIRY ANIMAL WELL-BEING, supra note 117.
119
See, e.g., Luisa Bortesi & Rainer Fischer, The CRISPR/Cas9 System for Plant Genome Editing and Beyond, 33 BIOTECHNOLOGY ADVANCES 41, 48–49 (2015) (noting that genome editing both
speeds up and increases the efficiency of “conventional breeding”); Harry Pettit, GeneticallyModified Cows Without Horns Are Created to Make the Countryside Safer, DAILY MAIL (Feb. 20,
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The selective breeding narrative argues for little or no additional regulation due to the genetic similarities between a product edited using
CRISPR and a product developed over multiple generations using conventional breeding techniques. It also situates CRISPR within a context familiar and nonthreatening. This lens calls into question the justifications for
regulating a CRISPR-edited organism, as well as the notion of what it
means to label a product as “natural.” 120 If CRISPR is analogous to selective breeding or natural selection, it follows that gene-edited organisms are
no less natural than their counterparts that could foster similar genetic
changes through conventional reproduction.
The selective breeding analogy calls for limited oversight, even in circumstances where genetic alteration could foster irreversible impacts to
species and the environment. Adopting this perspective would likely lead to
the development of edited organisms that extend well beyond those necessary to protect vexing health and ecological issues. It is easy to imagine, for
example, the multibillion-dollar pest control industry deploying gene editing to eradicate insects that are nuisances but do not pose threats to human
health or agricultural products.
The argument has its limitations, as there are important differences between CRISPR and selective breeding. Selective breeding takes time and
allows ecosystems and systems of governance to adjust. Gene editing
speeds the process, allowing it to outpace traditional regulatory responses.
Gene editing also allows a relatively small number of scientists to guide
how evolution occurs. Furthermore, genetic modifications may produce
different results than conventional breeding. 121
The FDA proposed a different tack that, if implemented, could provide
a model for stretching existing statutory language to address advances in
biotechnology. In January 2017, immediately prior to the end of the Obama
presidency, the FDA released new draft guidance that would apply to Recombinetics’s hornless cows. 122 The proposal expands the definition of “new
2017), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-4242148/Genetically-modified-hornless-cowsdeveloped-scientists.html [https://perma.cc/6E43-THJF] (noting that developers of a gene-edited
hornless dairy cow “compare their genetic modification methods to that of selective breeding”).
120
See generally William Cronon, The Trouble with Wilderness; or, Getting Back to the
Wrong Nature, in UNCOMMON GROUND: RETHINKING THE HUMAN PLACE IN NATURE 69, 69–90
(William Cronon ed. 1995) (explaining how the terms “wilderness” and “nature” originated and
why their current meanings may lead to misconceptions for environmentalists).
121
See Gregory N. Mandel, Gaps, Inexperience, Inconsistencies, and Overlaps: Crisis in the
Regulation of Genetically Modified Plants and Animals, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2167, 2234
(2004) (“[G]enetic modification may cause different effects than those caused by conventional
breeding.”).
122
FDA GE ANIMALS DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 71, at 6–8; Maxmen, supra note 39.
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animal drug” under the FDCA to include “animals with intentionally altered
genomic DNA developed through use of genome editing technologies, as
well as techniques such as rDNA in genetic engineering.” 123 The FDA justifies the expanded definition because genetic engineering alters the “structure
or function of the animal.” 124 The guidance applies to non-heritable gene
edits, but is primarily aimed at addressing heritable (germline) edits. 125 The
regulatory change would subject both the animal initially altered (“the
founder animal”) and the “entire subsequent lineage of animals that contains the genomic alteration” to the FDCA’s pre-market approval requirements—a process some stakeholders argue would discourage beneficial uses of gene editing due to the length of the FDA’s review. 126
This draft guidance signals a partial departure from the presumption
that biotechnology is not inherently risky. Although it maintains the riskbased, case-by-case assessment of new products, the expanded definition of
animal drug would establish a rebuttable presumption that geneticallymodified animals are subject to FDA regulation. This issue remains unsettled, however. Because gene editing does not insert foreign DNA into animals, the FDA requested public comment regarding the risks associated
with technologies such as CRISPR to determine whether they should be
subject to the expanded animal drug definition. 127
Relying on the natural selection analogy, Recombinetics contends that
the FDA should consider the hornless cows as “generally recognized as safe”
and therefore allow marketing without FDA approval. 128 Recombinetics executives believe that the USDA’s reasoning in the CRISPR mushroom and
waxy corn cases should apply in this case as well, arguing that the cows
should not face FDA review simply because an edited gene was “intention123

Animals with Intentionally Altered Genomic DNA, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.
fda.gov/AnimalVeterinary/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/GeneticEngineering/GeneticallyEnginee
redAnimals/default.htm [https://perma.cc/79VZ-C5ST].
124
FDA GE ANIMALS DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 71, at 7. The animal itself is not considered the drug. Rather the genetically-engineered animals are regulated as containing “new animal
drugs.” Id.
125
Id. at 4 (stating that “[a]lthough much of this guidance will be relevant to non-heritable
intentionally altered genomic DNA, this guidance primarily addresses heritable intentionally altered genomic DNA”).
126
Id. at 3. The proposed guidance document identifies seven elements required for the approval process of “new animal drugs”: (i) product definition, (ii) molecular characterization of the
intentional alteration, (iii) molecular characterization of the lineage animal, (iv) phenotypic characterization of the animal, (v) durability assessment and plan, (vi) environmental and food safety,
and (vii) claim validation. Id. at 22–27.
127
Id. at 14.
128
Maxmen, supra note 39. According to Recombinetics, gene editing provides “a simple,
direct, rapid solution” to the animal welfare concerns regarding dehorning. DAIRY ANIMAL WELLBEING, supra note 117.
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ally put it into the cows’ DNA.” 129 The FDA has not made a final determination regarding the hornless cow or the draft guidance. The outcomes of
both will be important indications of how the current legal system will respond to the evolving field of gene editing.
B. Ecological Impacts
A second gap in the biotechnology governance framework is the lack
of a comprehensive system for evaluating the ecological impacts of geneedited organisms. As the USDA notes, a rigid distinction between products
that are plant pests and those that are not fails to sufficiently identify all of
the plant risks that the products present to other plants or plant products. 130
Rather than directly address the scope of ecological considerations that
should inform regulators as they consider approval of genetically-modified
organisms, the FDA and USDA rely primarily on the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) to assess environmental impacts. 131 NEPA serves
an important function by requiring entities to collect data, evaluate potential
environmental impacts, and provide the public with an opportunity to submit comments prior to issuing a final decision. 132 NEPA does not, however,
mandate any specific action after evaluating environmental impacts, thus
failing to provide any guidance regarding the types of environmental risks
that are acceptable. 133 Nor do existing statutes applicable in the biotechnology context address broader ecological impacts. USDA regulations, for example, fail to address questions regarding the release of geneticallymodified organisms (“GMOs”) intended to minimize the potential for environmental risk that may occur after the release of genetically-engineered
products. 134
The following subsections use two recent examples of NEPA review
prior to the release of genetically-modified insects to demonstrate how the
law applies in the biotechnology context and explore the limitations of reliance on NEPA as the primary means of considering the ecological impacts
of gene-edited organisms.
129

Maxmen, supra note 39.
PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE PRODUCTS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 14, at 96, 98.
131
National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2018); see 2017 Update to
Coordinated Framework, supra note 41, at 21−22 (stating that both the USDA and FDA still
comply with NEPA requirements when they are applicable).
132
2017 Update to Coordinated Framework, supra note 41, at 22−23; see Victor B. Flatt, The
“Worst Case” May Be the Best: Rethinking NEPA Law to Avoid Future Environmental Disasters,
6 ENVT’L & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 25, 32–36 (2011) (describing the requirements of an environmental impact study under NEPA).
133
42 U.S.C. § 4332(C).
134
Angelo, supra note 40, at 136–37.
130
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1. Mosquitoes and Moths
In August 2016, the FDA approved a proposed field test of geneticallymodified Aedes aegypti mosquitoes on the island of Key Haven, Florida—
the first modified animal approved for release by the FDA. 135 Oxitec, the
sponsor of the proposed field trial, used recombinant DNA to alter genes of
male mosquitoes to prevent their offspring from reaching maturity (referred
to as a “self-limiting” gene). 136 Although the proposed trial utilizes transgenic modifications (inserting foreign DNA into the male mosquitoes) rather than gene editing via CRISPR, the FDA’s approach to the proposed
trial will likely apply to any future proposals to release organisms modified
via gene editing techniques. 137
In addition to the FDA’s approval, the Florida Keys Mosquito Control
District allowed local residents to vote on a nonbinding resolution regarding
approval of the proposed trial, offering one ballot referendum for residents
living in the area where the mosquitoes would be released and another referendum for all residents of the surrounding county. 138 Voters split on the
issue when it was added to a ballot referendum. 139 Residents living in the
area where the mosquitoes were to be released voted against the trial,
whereas residents in the surrounding county approved the referendum. 140
Oxitec executives subsequently announced the company would work with
the FDA to identify an alternate release site. 141

135
Susan Milius, FDA OKs First GM Mosquito Trial in U.S. but Hurdles Remain, SCI. NEWS
(Aug. 5, 2016), https://www.sciencenews.org/article/fda-oks-first-gm-mosquito-trial-us-hurdlesremain [https://perma.cc/LC47-JS2Z].
136
FDA MOSQUITO ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 7, at 16, 18, 21; see Friendly
Mosquitoes, OXITEC, https://www.oxitec.com/friendly-mosquitoes/ [https://perma.cc/TUD3-H6ZT]
(describing Oxitec’s proposed trial).
137
See FDA MOSQUITO ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 7, at 16 (noting that
Oxitec’s mosquitoes include a “recombinant DNA (rDNA) construct”).
138
GMO Mosquito Plan Headed for Residents’ Vote in Florida Keys, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Apr. 20, 2016), https://apnews.com/cbc584373614495c9df8703a61c6b6ac [https://perma.cc/
97R3-YHHB] [hereinafter GMO Mosquito Plan Vote]; Ike Swetlitz, Genetically Modified Mosquitoes Are One Step Closer to Being Released in Florida, STAT (Aug. 5, 2016), https://www.
statnews.com/2016/08/05/mosquitoes-genetically-modified-florida-zika/ [https://perma.cc/VT6W2VEN].
139
Andrew Joseph, Florida Keys Voters Split on Genetically Modified Mosquito Trial, STAT
(Nov. 8, 2016), https://www.statnews.com/2016/11/08/florida-keys-voters-split-on-geneticallymodified-mosquitoes/ [https://perma.cc/YBF8-JGP2].
140
Id.
141
Marley Walker, Florida Votes to Release Millions of Zika-Fighting Mosquitos, WIRED (Nov.
10, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/11/florida-votes-release-millions-zika-fighting-mosquitos/
[https://perma.cc/W9ZZ-TTAT].
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Prior to approving the field test, the FDA conducted an environmental
assessment (“EA”) pursuant to its obligations under NEPA. 142 The scope of
the EA was limited to the potential impact of the limited field trial. A broader release, or a release in different locations, may require additional EAs
and potentially more in-depth Environmental Impact Assessments. 143
The FDA considered a series of risk-based questions to evaluate the
potential adverse effects on humans, animals, and the environment. 144 The
EA identified forty-three endangered species in the area of the proposed
field trial; however, it found no overlap between the identified endangered
species and the area of the field test. 145 The EA further identified two wildlife refuge sites nearby but found that target mosquitoes were “rarely” located in those areas. 146 The FDA determined that the release of the geneedited mosquito would not affect the refuges or the endangered species as
the isolated site allows for no habitat overlap among the species. 147 Additionally, the FDA concluded that ingesting the altered mosquito would not
pose a health risk to animals because the genetic modification does not create toxins. 148
The FDA also analyzed the impacts of the mosquitoes escaping either
en route to the field site or at the actual field site, finding only a low risk for
human health and the environment. 149 Expanding the scope of the potential
risks, the FDA examined the effects on the environment of the United States
as a whole. 150 Again, the EA found that “release, survival, establishment,
142

42 U.S.C. § 4332; FDA MOSQUITO ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 7, at 19.
See FDA Releases Final Environmental Assessment for Genetically Engineered Mosquito,
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Aug. 5, 2016), https://www.fda.gov/animalveterinary/newsevents/cvm
updates/ucm490246.htm [https://perma.cc/6RAB-CHA4] (stating that “FDA’s finalization of the
EA and FONSI does not mean that Oxitec’s GE mosquitoes are approved for commercial use”).
144
FDA MOSQUITO ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 7, at 17. The questions included:
143

[T]he likelihood of inadvertent release[,] . . . the likelihood of establishment of [the
modified] mosquitoes at the proposed trial site[,] . . . the likelihood of dispersal of
[the] mosquitoes and their progeny from the proposed trial site[,] . . . the likelihood
that the rDNA construct could be transferred to humans or other organisms[,] . . . the
likelihood that release of [the modified] mosquitoes would have of adverse effects
on non-target species at the proposed site[,] . . . the likelihood [of] adverse effects on
humans or other animals[,] . . . [and] the likely consequences to, or effects on the
environment of the United States . . . .
Id. at 16−17.
145
Id. at 45–46, 91.
146
Id. at 46–48.
147
Id. at 48.
148
Id.
149
Id. at 75 tbl.6.
150
Id. at 99–103.
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and spread” of the modified mosquito would not have adverse effects on
either the environment, human health, or non-target animal health. 151
The FDA determined that a full environmental impact statement was
unnecessary due to three key findings. First, approximately 95% of the
modified mosquitoes’ offspring would perish before reproducing, thus
providing a biological containment mechanism for the proposed trial.152
Second, the island location provided “geophysical containment.” 153 Third,
the EA compared the field test to the risks associated with a “no action”
alternative of continued reliance on integrated mosquito management practices involving aerial larvicide application from an airplane. 154
Oxitec has also received approval for a field test of geneticallymodified diamondback moths, insects that feed on kale, broccoli, brussels
sprouts, and other crops, causing an estimated global loss of $5 billion annually. 155 The gene modification is similar to that used to develop the modified Aedes aegypti mosquito, whereby the female offspring of a geneticallymodified moth die before they are able to reproduce. 156 The moth is classified as a “pest” under the PPA and therefore subject to USDA jurisdiction. 157 The moth does not fall within the jurisdiction of the FDA or EPA
because it does not yield food for human or livestock consumption and does
not contain plant-incorporated protectants or require the use of other pesticides that are not already in use for other non-gene-edited moths. 158 The
modified moth could potentially fall within the FDA’s proposed guidance
regarding genetically-engineered animals. 159
151

Id. at 103.
Id. at 17−18.
153
Id. at 17.
154
Id. at 20–21. Even with additional unpredictable adulticide methods, the effectiveness rate
of controlling the specific disease carrying mosquito is only around 50% not including the mosquitoes developing a potential resistance. Id.
155
DEP’T OF AGRIC., PROPOSAL TO PERMIT THE FIELD RELEASE OF GENETICALLYENGINEERED DIAMONDBACK MOTH IN NEW YORK: ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 1, 10, 62 (Dec.
2016), https://www.aphis.usda.gov/brs/aphisdocs/16_076101r_pea.pdf [https://perma.cc/JW2FBGH3] [hereinafter DIAMONDBACK MOTH ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT]. The field trial took
place on a ten-acre plot of the Cornell University New York State Agricultural Experiment Station
in Geneva, New York, and lasted approximately one month. Id. at 1, 59.
156
Availability of a Final Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact
for the Field Release of Genetically-Engineered Diamondback Moths, 82 Fed. Reg. 31,548,
31,548 (July 7, 2017).
157
DIAMONDBACK MOTH ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 155, at 2−3, 6−8.
158
Id. at 7–8.
159
See FDA GE ANIMALS DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 71, at 6–8 (noting that the FDA has
authority over “new animal drugs” defined in the FDCA as “articles intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man or other animals,” and “articles
(other than food) intended to affect the structure or any function of the boy of man or other animals”).
152
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The USDA completed an EA that compared the current strategy of
controlling moth populations via pesticides to risks associated with the proposed field trial of the genetically-modified moth. 160 The EA revealed no
cumulative environmental impacts resulting from approval of the field release and concluded that the field release would not impact threatened or
endangered species. 161 On the contrary, the USDA determined that approving the genetically-modified moth may lead to environmental benefits by
reducing the amount of insecticides applied during the growing season. 162
Harm to species that prey on the moths was unlikely because the moth population would otherwise be controlled with pesticides and the preying species consume other insects. 163 Additionally, the introduced traits were not
likely allergenic or toxic to those consuming the genetically-modified
moths. 164 The USDA identified the potential risk of DNA transfer from the
gene-edited moths to individual soil microflora, but concluded the transfer
was unlikely. 165 Overall, the EA revealed that permitting the field trial simply continues the approaches already in place in the agroecosystem limiting
biodiversity and thus concluded that the impact of the field trial on the
physical environment (including soil, water, air quality, and climate change)
was comparable to impacts of conventional pesticide use via the no action
alternative. 166
The EA also assessed the current health hazards to both the general
public and farmworkers. 167 The USDA distinguished between the two
groups because the proximity of the farmworkers to the moth raises their
exposure risks compared to the general public, including risks associated
with conventional pesticides as well as any risks associated with the genetically-modified moths. 168 For example, there is a potential risk that farmworkers may develop allergic responses as a result of the moths’ hair and
scales. 169 The USDA found little variance from current exposure to nongene-edited moths, however. 170 Unlike the proposed Key Haven mosquito

160

DIAMONDBACK MOTH ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 155, at 1–6.
Id. at 62.
162
Id. at 58.
163
Id. at 57–58.
164
Id. at 57.
165
Id. at 44–45.
166
Id. at 32–33, 44, 58.
167
Id. at 59–61.
168
Id. at 59–60.
169
Id. at 61.
170
Id.
161
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trial, there was no public referendum, although the USDA accepted public
comments on the EA. 171
2. Limitations of NEPA
The direct connection between natural resource management, environmental protection, and governance of genetic engineering is irrefutable.
Altering genomes alters organisms and, in the case of gene drives, potentially the genetic makeup of future generations. The impacts may also extend
far beyond the target organisms. Gene edits may allow some species to outcompete others, allow them to move to new habitats and thus affect a new
group of species, or potentially make some resources more valuable for
human consumption and thus more subject to extraction. In the context of
gene editing technologies that could eradicate species and permanently alter
others, reliance on a procedural statute—NEPA—to inform decisions about
environmental risk is insufficient. 172 Although NEPA may identify the important issues, it does not offer guidance to resolve the issues or require the
agencies considering release of gene-edited organisms to address the concerns.
The prospect of engineering extinction or de-extinction (using gene editing to recreate extinct species) via CRISPR is an acute example of the interplay between natural resource statutes and gene editing that requires
more than NEPA review. Although protection against invasive species is an
important aspect of resource management, statutes generally aim to prevent,
rather than facilitate, extinction. 173 The Endangered Species Act (“ESA”)
and Marine Mammal Protection Act (“MMPA”) prohibit a wide range of
activities that could harm or kill threatened or endangered species. 174 The
171

Id. at 8–9.
See, e.g., Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980)
(stating that “once an agency has made a decision subject to NEPA’s procedural requirements, the
only role for a court is to insure that the agency has considered the environmental consequences”);
Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978) (finding that NEPA is “essentially procedural”); Philip Michael Ferester, Revitalizing the National
Environmental Policy Act: Substantive Law Adaptations from NEPA’s Progeny, 16 HARV. ENVTL.
L. REV. 207, 217 (1992) (stating that “[f]earing extensive judicial intervention in administrative
decision making under NEPA, the Court began limiting the effect of the various circuit court decisions that seemed to allow such intervention”).
173
See, e.g., Invasive Species, ILL. DEP’T OF NAT. RES., https://www.dnr.illinois.gov/
conservation/IWAP/Pages/InvasiveSpecies.aspx [https://perma.cc/9CYM-NQCQ] (stating that “[i]nvasive species pose one of the greatest threats to Illinois’ natural areas, native communities, and
natural resources”).
174
See, e.g., Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361−1421h (2018) (prohibiting the “taking” of marine mammals, defined as “to harass, hunt, capture, or kill, or attempt to
harass, hunt, capture, or kill any marine mammal”); Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C.
172
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Pelly Amendment and Packwood-Magnuson Amendment seek to enforce
international whaling restrictions. 175 Other statutes seek to restrict international trade in threatened or endangered species and support conservation
measures in countries of origin. 176 These statutes are explicitly valuesbased, dedicating tax dollars to preserve some of the world’s most vulnerable species, restricting economic activity, and, in the case of the ESA, implementing federal restrictions on private land use to protect habitat of covered species. 177 These restrictions are not based solely on anthropocentric
goals or on ecosystem health. The statutes aim to protect individual members of a threatened or endangered species, and protections are based on
scientific assessments rather than consideration of the value to humans or
economic impacts. 178
Extinction is generally a slow process. This is a key presumption of the
ESA, allowing government scientists time to identify potentially vulnerable
species and complete studies assessing their status and threats to their viability. 179 The United States Fish & Wildlife Service must complete the pro§ 1538 (2018) (prohibiting the import, export, and taking of any endangered species of fish or
wildlife).
175
Packwood-Magnuson Amendment, Pub. L. No. 96-61, 93 Stat. 407 (1979) (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(2) (2018)) (imposing a reduction of not less than fifty percent in
the fishing rights of any foreign country that violates international whaling laws in U.S. waters);
Pelly Amendment, Pub. L. No. 92-219, 85 Stat. 786 (1971) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C.
§ 1978 (2018)) (allowing the president to restrict fish imports from nations that violate international whale conservation standards).
176
See, e.g., Lacey Act Amendments of 1981, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371−3378 (2018) (prohibiting
interstate and international trafficking in exotic animals); African Elephant Conservation Act, 16
U.S.C. § 4203 (2018) (stating that the Act seeks to aid in the “conservation and protection of the
African elephant by supporting the conservation programs of African countries”);Wild Bird Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 4901−4916 (2018) (restricting international trade of exotic birds and
encouraging conservation programs in countries of origin); Rhinoceros and Tiger Conservation
Act, 16 U.S.C. § 5302 (2018) (stating the Act’s purpose is “[t]o assist in the conservation of rhinoceros and tigers by supporting the conservation programs of nations whose activities directly or
indirectly affect rhinoceros and tiger populations”).
177
See, e.g., Bruce Babbitt, Between the Flood and the Rainbow: Our Covenant to Protect the
Whole of Creation, 2 ANIMAL L. 1, 1 (1996) (discussing “the moral, ethical, and religious values
underlying the Endangered Species Act”).
178
See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1533(b) (stating that the secretary determines whether a species is endangered or threatened based on “scientific and commercial data”); 4211(d)(1) (providing protections for the African elephant through research, conservation and management programs, and
development of scientific information); 5304(d)(3) (allowing projects to assist conservation efforts
and development of scientific information for the protection of rhinoceros or tigers).
179
Endangered Species: Listing and Critical Habitat: Overview, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV.,
https://www.fws.gov/endangered/what-we-do/listing-overview.html [https://perma.cc/4XY9-Y53G].
The MMPA protects marine mammals by default but provides for limited exceptions. NOAA Fisheries, Laws & Policies: Marine Mammal Protection Act, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN.,
http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/laws/mmpa/ [https://perma.cc/CC48-FQ6W].
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cess and list a species as either endangered or threatened before ESA protections apply. 180
Using gene drives to prevent reproduction could foster population collapses at such a rapid pace that the Fish & Wildlife Service could not complete the listing process. 181 Furthermore, even if regulators were able to
complete an expedited listing process, the gene drive could still result in
eventual extinction. A gene drive proliferating through a population would
not trigger ESA or MMPA restrictions if there is no additional prohibited act
to the listed species. In other words, the “harm” to the species caused by the
gene drive could occur prior to listing, and thus fall outside the scope of the
ESA.
De-extinction may challenge natural resource statutes from a different
angle, calling into question core tenets of laws and treaties aimed at protecting threatened and endangered species. 182 Is the goal merely existence of
the species, or does the ability to engage in de-extinction also require habitat rehabilitation? 183 In the event a single member of an extinct species is
recreated, it would be endangered by definition (but not subject to ESA protections prior to listing the species as threatened or endangered). 184 Would
reintroducing additional members of the species be necessary to ensure the
survival of the species, or would it be acceptable to mate with existing species, maintain the recreated organism in captivity, or release the organism in
areas that are similar to its original habitat? The ESA and the suite of laws
applying to genetically-engineered organisms do not contemplate these issues, and at best NEPA only requires that the agencies give them due consideration.

180

16 U.S.C. § 1538(a) (2018).
Charleston Noble et al., Current CRISPR Gene Drive Systems Are Likely to Be Highly Invasive in Wild Populations, 7 eLife e33423 (2018), https://elifesciences.org/articles/33423 [https://
perma.cc/4RTX-2X7N] (“Our models show that although resistance prevents spread to fixation in
large populations, even the least effective drive systems reported to date are likely to be highly
invasive. Releasing a small number of organisms will often cause invasion of the local population,
followed by invasion of additional populations connected by very low rates of gene flow.”).
182
See Gregory E. Kaebnick & Bruce Jennings, De-extinction and Conservation, 47 HASTINGS CTR. REP. S2, S2 (July−Aug. 2017) (discussing the ethical considerations presented by deextinction).
183
See Alejandro E. Camacho, Going the Way of the Dodo: De-Extinction, Dualisms, and
Reframing Conservation, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 849, 856–57 (2015) (noting that the placement of
a de-extinct species into its prior habitat could have ecological benefits).
184
16 U.S.C. § 1538(a).
181
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C. Agencies’ Authority to Consider Alternatives
Avoidance of regulatory coverage and the lack of substantive ecological considerations are not the only gaps in biotechnology oversight presented by CRISPR. In many circumstances, existing laws also limit the factors
that government officials may consider when determining whether to approve a genetically-engineered product. Where officials do have authority to
look beyond the product-specific risk assessment, there is a lack of policy
guidance to inform how they should wield that authority. For example, the
current governance framework, including the 2017 Update to the Coordinated Framework, does not consider whether there are circumstances when
a genetic modification may be safe but offer no benefit beyond those
achievable via alternate, equally safe means. 185 Gene editing may also play
an important role in modifying species to help them adapt to the changing
climate and related issues such as the spread of diseases. 186 Releasing genetically-modified organisms when equally effective alternatives exist, or
when the gene modification is not aimed at addressing a critical health or
environmental concern, may be another matter. 187
Opponents of the Key Haven field test pointed to the ability to achieve
a similar result using conventional bacteria rather than geneticallyengineered organisms, suggesting opposition to genetically-modified organisms rather than eradicating the species by interfering with the reproduction
cycle. 188 The FDA’s basis for approval, however, did not rest on the severe
health impacts of the mosquito-borne diseases, the potential benefits of reduced pesticide use, or the fact that the Aedes aegypti mosquito is not native
185

2017 Update to Coordinated Framework, supra note 41.
See, e.g., Chase Purdy, A Global Chocolate Crisis Looms, but Scientists Believe They Can
Genetically Engineer a Fix, QUARTZ (Jan 3, 2018), https://qz.com/1170536/crispr-gene-editedcacao-plants-could-save-the-chocolate-industry-from-climate-change/ [https://perma.cc/PL4Q-T3NN]
(explaining that gene editing is helping develop cocoa plants less vulnerable to diseases resulting
from a changing climate in areas where the plant is primarily grown).
187
Research suggests that public perceptions of gene editing differ depending on the specific
applications. See, e.g., Dietram A. Scheufele et al., U.S. Attitudes on Human Genome Editing, 357
SCI. 553, 553–54 (2017) (detailing greater public acceptance of gene editing for therapeutic purposes and lower acceptance for enhancement purposes).
188
See Susan Milius, In Florida, They’re Fighting Mosquitoes by Meddling with Their Sex
Lives, SCI. NEWS (May 8, 2017), https://www.sciencenews.org/article/florida-theyre-fightingmosquitoes-meddling-their-sex-lives [https://perma.cc/A9GS-NH2F] (describing a 2017 alternate
field trial in Key Haven involving mosquitoes infected with existing—i.e., not geneticallymodified—Wolbachia bacteria). Notably, because the Wolbachia bacteria is not geneticallymodified, the release falls under EPA rather than FDA jurisdiction even though it, like Oxitec’s
modified mosquito, aims to significantly reduce the Aedes aegypti population by preventing male
mosquitoes from reproducing. News Release, Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Grants Extension of Experimental Use Permit for ‘Wolbachia Mosquito’ (Sept. 21, 2016), https://www.epa.gov/pesticides/epagrants-extension-experimental-use-permit-wolbachia-mosquito [https://perma.cc/62NM-X44P].
186
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to the Florida Keys. The focus was on the safety of the trial, not the relative
benefits of the genetically-modified mosquito in the event the trial is ultimately successful. 189 The Coordinated Framework does not identify circumstances for proper and improper release of genetically-engineered organisms, provided they satisfy the lead agency’s risk-based assessment.
The argument here is not that gene editing should not proceed if other
options exist. Some of these potential changes undoubtedly offer societal
benefits. It is important, however, to recognize that the legal system is not
designed to distinguish between gene editing applications that address critical societal needs versus those that are cosmetic, duplicative of equally effective options, or address social needs but raise the prospect of harmful
impacts beyond the scope of an agency’s current jurisdiction.
D. Consideration of Competing Ideologies
A fourth gap points to a more fundamental challenge for biotechnology
governance: although the existing regulatory framework may consider nearterm anticipated risks presented by evolving gene editing technologies, it
fails to address the broader range of societal interests and values inherent in
the biotechnology debate. 190 Value choices are embedded in every aspect of
biotechnology governance. 191 Research and risk assessments may answer a
threshold question regarding safety, but are not dispositive on their own.
Data suggesting the likelihood of significant harm to humans or the ecosystem would create a powerful presumption against release. The reverse is not
necessarily true. Scientific consensus regarding safety and anticipated benefits of a new genetically-engineered organism may be persuasive but may
also fail to consider additional concerns regarding the modified organism or
the rationales for utilizing genetic modifications.
189

See FDA MOSQUITO ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 7, at 16–19 (providing
overview and discussing the goals of the assessment).
190
This gap is not unique to the field of gene editing. See Gary E. Marchant et al., What Does
the History of Technology Regulation Teach Us About Nano Oversight?, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
724, 727 (2009) (stating that “[e]xisting regulatory frameworks often exclude consideration of
social and moral concerns, ruling them outside the bounds of the jurisdiction of regulatory agencies or reviewing courts”).
191
See GENE DRIVES ON THE HORIZON, supra note 12, at 5 (stating that “[q]uestions about
gene drives rest on values at every step, from whether, why, and how research should be conducted to whether and where a gene-drive modified organism should be released into the environment”); PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE PRODUCTS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 14, at 69 box
3-1 (stating that “[v]alues are always embedded in risk analysis by the choices and interpretations
of the people conducting them and the selection of risk-assessment endpoints of concern, methods,
and questions”); Kuzma, supra note 109, at 167 (“[I]t is impossible to be completely ‘science
based’ in a regulatory system. Value judgements are embedded in all risk and safety assessments.”).
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The decision to prioritize development of biotechnology products
through a product-based regulatory system is itself a value choice. The focus on risk as a primary criterion for governance is another implicit value
choice and raises numerous follow-up questions. 192 Determining who is at
risk, what risks are considered, and what is an unacceptable risk requires
tradeoffs. 193 Furthermore, policymakers implementing the risk-based approach must decide whether to discount future risks, how much weight, if
any, to grant to ecological risks and risks to non-human organisms, and how
certain must a risk be to influence a regulatory decision. 194 Value choices
also arise when considering whether to draw distinctions between germline
and somatic alterations, therapeutic versus enhancement purposes, and human versus non-human applications. 195
Defining safety and risk as the primary (or sole) criteria for evaluating
a biotechnology application results in a one-dimensional debate. GMO advocates frequently point to the high level of market penetration of agricultural GMO seeds and the lack of evidence of safety issues as an open and
shut case regarding the value and safety of genetic engineering. 196 The result is a consistent dismissal of concerns about existing GMO products and,
by extension, advances in genetic engineering generally. 197 Health concerns
regarding genetically-modified agricultural products have proven unfounded, and proponents of minimal regulatory limitations on biotechnology de192

Samuel J. Rascoff & Richard L. Revesz, The Biases of Risk Tradeoff Analysis: Towards
Parity in Environmental and Health-and-Safety Regulation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1763, 1765
(2002).
193
Id.
194
See, e.g., David Winickoff et al., Adjudicating the GM Food Wars: Science, Risk, and
Democracy in World Trade Law, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 81, 94 (2005) (discussing the ways that risk
identification and framing impact risk analysis, including “by dictating how different types and
sources of scientific uncertainty will be integrated into the risk-identification and risk-evaluation
process”); see also NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING RISK: INFORMING DECISIONS IN A
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 103 (Paul C. Stern & Harvey V. Fineberg eds., 1996) (stating that
“[t]echniques that aim to simplify risk necessarily embed value choices, some of them highly
contentious”).
195
See, e.g., Kelly E. Ormond et al., Human Germline Genome Editing, 101 AM. J. HUM.
GENETICS 167, 169 (2017) (differentiating between germline editing and somatic gene editing and
both methods’ impact on CRISPR-Cas9).
196
See, e.g., Jon Entine, Will Biotechnology Regulations Squelch Next Food and Farming Innovation?, GENETIC LITERACY PROJECT 1, 2 (2017) (arguing that advancements in recent genetic engineering technology support changing of old, “overly-restrictive” regulations that do not account for a
“clear consensus on [genetic engineering] safety”); Commonly Asked Questions About the Food
Safety of GMOs, MONSANTO (Apr. 6, 2017), https://monsanto.com/company/commitments/safety/
statements/are-gmos-safe/ [https://perma.cc/88PZ-B88B] (citing the prevalence of geneticallymodified organisms and benefits associated with their use).
197
See Entine, supra note 196 (noting that the regulations of genetically engineered products
are out of date and stifle innovation).
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velopments point to these results as evidence that future gene editing of
seeds and livestock is also likely to be safe. 198
To dismiss these concerns with a response about a product’s safety
misses the point. The range of issues leading to concern with, or opposition
to, genetic engineering is broad. If the debate were truly one dimensional,
reliance on data demonstrating a lack of negative health or ecological impacts caused by existing GMO products would presumably be persuasive.
The fact that opposition continues, even among scientists involved in biotechnology research, demonstrates that concerns extend beyond safety and
risk. 199 The debate about GMOs is as much about values as it is about science. 200 Although some opposition to GMOs is about health concerns, and
those holding those concerns may continue to maintain their beliefs despite
any amount of evidence to the contrary, policymakers should also understand ongoing references to health concerns as rooted in a deeper set of values-based concerns.
Stakeholder perspectives regarding biotechnology governance take
many forms. For many scientists in the public and private sectors, there is a
moral imperative to pursue advances in the field of genetics. 201 If scientists
198

See NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., GENETICALLY-ENGINEERED CROPS: EXPERIENCES AND PROSPECTS 225 (2016) (finding that GE foods pose no higher human health risks

than non-GE food, based upon extensive data and tests conducted); see also Enriquez, supra note
7, at 514−15 (explaining that despite the unknowns of future biotechnology, decades of scientific
research indicate that the health risks associated with both recombinant and non-recombinant GM
crops are similar, and thus a strictly “risk-based approach” supports deregulation of future biotechnology products); Alessandro Nicolia et al., An Overview of the Last 10 Years of Genetically
Engineered Crop Safety Research, 34 CRITICAL REVS. IN BIOTECHNOLOGY 77, 84–85 (2013)
(finding that research over the past ten years has yet to directly link health risk to GM crops).
199
GENE DRIVES ON THE HORIZON, supra note 12, at 65 (noting “the possibility that some
ways of using genetic technologies conflict with underlying moral norms that are implicit in how
human beings understand the world, including their own nature and relationship to the rest of the
world”); see Emily Marden, Risk and Regulation: U.S. Regulatory Policy on Genetically Modified
Food and Agriculture, 44 B.C. L. REV. 733, 743 (2003) (highlighting that the debate surrounding
GMOs ranges from economic concerns, to health concerns, to agriculture and more).
200
See GENE DRIVES ON THE HORIZON, supra note 12, at 65 (stating that “[q]uestions about
gene drives rest on values at every step, from whether, why, and how research should be conducted to whether and where a gene-drive modified organism should be released into the environment”); see also Keith Kloor, Food Evolution Is Scientifically Accurate. Too Bad It Won’t Convince Anyone, SLATE (June 23, 2017), http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/science/
2017/06/food_evolution_is_correct_on_gmos_and_unconvincing.html [https://perma.cc/L3H6-8RH9]
(noting that individuals’ values or beliefs regarding GMOs often outweigh scientific evidence of
GMO safety).
201
See Kuzma, supra note 109, at 166 (quoting plant scientist Ingo Potrykus stating that “it
would be a ‘crime against humanity’ not to change from ‘regulating a technology on ideological
terms’ to ‘science-based regulation, guided by considerations of the risks and benefits of the
trait’”); see also George Church, Encourage the Innovators, 528 NATURE S7, S7 (2015) (“[T]he
concept of a ban on germline editing does not make sense. . . . Banning human-germline editing
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have the ability to address severe health problems, it becomes a moral
choice whether to do so. 202 These biotechnology proponents argue that restrictions on gene editing research could deny society numerous promising
benefits: elimination of vector-borne diseases such as the Zika virus and
malaria, diseases such as sickle cell anemia and cystic fibrosis caused by
genetic defects, and potentially a range of other lethal and debilitating viruses and diseases, including HIV. 203 Increased food production and decreased use of pesticides are other commonly cited benefits. 204 Some opponents of restrictions on gene editing and other biotechnologies also point to
the competitive disadvantages if the United States maintains its ban on human hereditary modifications even though other countries permit it. 205 The
moral imperative ideology is not solely about human health benefits. Restrictions on gene editing could also prevent developments that could help
conserve threatened and endangered species by inserting traits that make
them more resilient to changing environmental conditions or potentially
bringing species back from extinction. 206
could put a damper on the best medical research and instead drive the practice underground to
black markets and uncontrolled medical tourism . . . .”); Julian Savulescu et al., The Moral Imperative to Continue Gene Editing Research on Human Embryos, 6 PROTEIN & CELL 476, 476 (2015)
(stating that “[t]o intentionally refrain from engaging in life-saving research is to be morally responsible for the foreseeable, avoidable deaths of those who could have benefitted”) (citing PETER
SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS 208–09, 226–28 (2d ed. 1993)); William J. Clinton, President of the
United States, Remarks on Presenting the National Medals of Science and Technology (Mar. 14,
2000) (transcript available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=58246 [https://
perma.cc/RE6L-CYDS]) (“Perhaps no science today is more compelling than the effort to decipher the human genome, a string of three billion letters that make up our genes . . . . This will be
the scientific breakthrough of the century, perhaps of all time”).
202
Kevin M. Esvelt, The Morality of Nature, SCULPTING NATURE, http://www.sculpting
evolution.org/blog/themoralityofnature [https://perma.cc/6686-Y58Q].
203
Marcy E. Gallo & John F. Sargent, Jr., CRISPR: A Revolutionary Tool for Editing the
Code of Life?, CONG. RES. SERV. INSIGHT 1, 2 (2016); see Doudna & Charpentier, supra note 25,
at 1077 (stating that “[CRISPR’s] application in genome-wide studies will enable large-scale
screening for drug targets and other phenotypes and will facilitate the generation of engineered
animal models that will benefit pharmacological studies and the understanding of human diseases”).
204
See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Seeds of Distrust: Federal Regulation of Genetically Modified Foods, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 403, 408−15 (2002) (discussing “potential benefits of genetically modified foods”).
205
See, e.g., I. Glenn Cohen & Eli Y. Adashi, The FDA Is Prohibited from Going Germline,
353 SCI. 545, 545−46 (2016) (noting the ban includes prohibitions on genetic modifications that
could prevent “rare incurable Mendelian disorders . . .[,] secure ‘savior siblings’ through editing of
the genome of a human embryo when in vitro fertilization fails to secure tissue-matched embryos
for intrauterine transfer[, and] mitochondrial DNA diseases by mitochondrial replacement”).
206
GENE DRIVES ON THE HORIZON, supra note 12, at 5–6. Efforts to reverse extinction could
prove ineffective unless the underlying causes of the extinction, such as habitat loss, are also addressed. Id. at 37–38; see Patrick Parenteau, Rearranging the Deck Chairs: Endangered Species
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Ongoing advocacy for risk-based governance presents a second viewpoint: faith in expert management to identify, evaluate, and manage risks
associated with the rapidly developing field of genetic engineering. 207 Science-based risk governance is a dominant theme for emerging technologies
generally, as it provides a pathway to allow continued technological development even when risks are unknown and potentially catastrophic. 208 Proponents of expert risk management recognize that there may be potential
downsides to a technology, but generally have faith that the risks are manageable if the proper oversight mechanisms are in place. Trust the experts,
these proponents argue, as they understand the technology and have the
means to control its impacts. 209 Although there is general support for riskbased governance, viewpoints regarding the proper application of risk management are not uniform. There is an ongoing debate among scientists and
other experts regarding the appropriate level of risk tolerance and the role of
the precautionary principle. 210 These debates are important and may impact
future governance choices, but they generally accept risk-based governance
as the appropriate starting point.
The first two viewpoints drive the dominant approach under U.S. law
and are reflected in the prioritization of risk management in recent reports
on gene editing by the National Academies. 211 As discussed in Part II, the
original 1986 Coordinated Framework and the 2017 Update to the Coordinated Framework conclude that continued advances in biotechnology are
desirable, that genetic engineering processes are not inherently risky, and
that it is possible to manage risks presented by specific geneticallyengineered products using the same regulatory mechanisms that apply to
conventional products. 212
Act Reforms in an Era of Mass Extinction, 22 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 227, 233
(1998) (identifying habitat loss as the primary factor driving mass extinction).
207
This viewpoint is similar to the reliance on technocratic federal resource managers that
emerged in the early 1900s. Jedediah Purdy, American Natures: The Shape of Conflict in Environmental Law, 36 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 169, 173−74, 208 (2012).
208
See Kuzma, supra note 109, at 166 (describing the United States’ risk-based regulation of
genetically-engineered products and processes).
209
See, e.g., Webber et al., supra note 45, at 10,565 (stating that “[r]esearchers, policymakers,
and resource managers must carefully weigh the risks of implementation that could threaten rather
than assist a given ecosystem”).
210
Kaebnick et al., supra note 9, at 710.
211
See GENE DRIVES ON THE HORIZON, supra note 12, at 22, 117–18 (listing numerous factors to consider in an ecological risk assessment of gene edited products); HUMAN GENOME EDITING, supra note 26, at 59 (listing factors such as promoting well-being, responsible science, respect for persons, and fairness as key components of gene editing oversight).
212
See 2017 Update to Coordinated Framework, supra note 41, at 1 (explaining that the Coordinated Framework “effectively protects health and the environment,” and the update serves to
prevent unnecessary barriers to developments in biotechnology innovation); see also 1986 Coor-
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Other perspectives in the gene editing debate extend beyond disagreements regarding scientific expertise and risk management. 213 Ecological
concerns, for example, frequently arise in the biotechnology context. 214 One
category of ecological concerns represent a subset of risk-based governance, focusing on concerns regarding impacts on other species, uncertain
environmental impacts, and irreversible, and potentially unintended, ecological changes. 215 Other ecological concerns extend beyond risk and merge
into a form of romanticism. 216 Some opponents to genetically-modified organisms evoke arguments similar to those used to promote wilderness
preservation—an appeal for sacred space unaltered (at least by deliberate
means) by humans. 217 Not only could gene editing alter the ecological balance, but it could also fundamentally alter humans’ relationship with nature
dinated Framework, supra note 48, at 23,303 (explaining that a working committee found that
current laws adequately addressed both traditional and new biotechnology techniques).
213
See, e.g., JOHN H. EVANS, PLAYING GOD?: HUMAN GENETIC ENGINEERING AND THE
RATIONALIZATION OF PUBLIC BIOETHICAL DEBATE 11−44 (2002) (analyzing how scientific expertise came to dominate the debate regarding human genetic engineering); Celia DeaneDrummond et al., Genetically Modified Theology: The Religious Dimensions of Public Concerns
About Agricultural Biotechnology, 14 STUDIES IN CHRISTIAN ETHICS 23, 23 (2001) (arguing that
opposition to GMOs is better understood “at the level of ontology and theology rather than simply
as concerns about physical risk and health”); Jennifer Kuzma & John C. Besley, Ethics of Risk
Analysis and Regulatory Review: From Bio- to Nanotechnology, 2 NANOETHICS 149, 159 (2008)
(noting that principles such as “integrity, justice, non-maleficence, and autonomy” affect public
perceptions of a new technology and “cannot be separated from beneficence, and risk analyses,
and regulatory review”).
214
As with many other issues, there is wide divergence among environmental groups regarding biotechnology. See, e.g., Advocacy Groups Call for Halt to Open Air Field Trials of Genetically Engineered Moths, CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY (Nov. 10, 2015), http://www.centerforfood
safety.org/press-releases/4118/advocacy-groups-call-for-halt-to-open-air-field-trials-of-geneticallyengineered-moths# [https://perma.cc/G8ZP-F5EB] (describing advocacy groups’ attempts to prevent the genetically-engineered moth trials and release due to safety concerns); Our Position on
Biotechnology, ENVTL. DEF. FUND, https://www.edf.org/our-position-biotechnology [https://
perma.cc/26F2-TBJV] (stating that the organization “will support or oppose specific biotechnology products or processes based on transparent assessments of their health, environmental, social,
and economic risks and benefits”); News Release, Friends of the Earth, USDA Proposal for Biotech Regulations Falls Short (Jan. 19, 2017), http://www.foe.org/news/news-releases/2017-01usda-proposal-for-biotech-regulations-falls-short [https://perma.cc/A7DK-RBZB] (stating that
“consumers don’t want a bunch of new unregulated GMO foods secretly flooding onto the market.
All GMOs—including those made with CRISPR, synthetic biology or other new genetic engineering techniques—must be regulated, safety assessed and labeled so that consumers can choose for
themselves what they are eating and feeding their families”).
215
See GENE DRIVES ON THE HORIZON, supra note 12, at 37 (discussing potential impacts on
non-target species); Angelo, supra note 40, at 103 (noting the environmental and ecological risks
posed by genetically-modified organisms).
216
Purdy, supra note 207, at 211.
217
See MARY SHELLEY, FRANKENSTEIN; OR, THE MODERN PROMETHEUS 40, 43–44 (1823)
(detailing the scientist’s turmoil in creating a “life”); Enriquez, supra note 7, at 438–39 (noting
gene editing opponents view that the process is “unnatural” and “wrong”).
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by eroding societal norms regarding the use of technology to alter species
and ecosystems. 218
Other stakeholders express a general discomfort with “playing God”
through genetic engineering. 219 This viewpoint arises most commonly in the
context of direct human applications. 220 Limitations on human embryo editing are partly justified under a risk-based ideology—there is too much we
do not know and too much harm could occur, especially in the context of
germline edits that may persist through future generations. 221 The existing
ban on federal funding for human embryo editing, and recommendations for
stricter oversight for human embryo editing in the event it is allowed,
218
Charo & Greely, supra note 29, at 15; see Heidi Ledford, The Landscape for Human Genome Editing: A View of International Regulations Suggests Where in the World a CRISPR Baby
Could Be Born, 526 NATURE 310, 310 (2015) (“Fears loom that if genome editing becomes acceptable in the clinic to stave off disease, it will inevitably come to be used to introduce, enhance
or eliminate traits for non-medical reasons.”). Nature is not a discreet, static, or easily identified
state. See William Cronon, Introduction: In Search of Nature, in UNCOMMON GROUND, RETHINKING THE HUMAN PLACE IN NATURE 23, 34−52 (William Cronon ed. 1995) (describing the difficulty society has faced over time in defining and understanding nature). References to nature and
wilderness do, however, suggest that they are areas beyond the realm of human development. For
example, the Wilderness Act, states that:

In order to assure that an increasing population, accompanied by expanding settlement and growing mechanization, does not occupy and modify all areas within the
United States and its possessions, leaving no lands designated for preservation and
protection in their natural condition, it is hereby declared to be the policy of the
Congress to secure for the American people of present and future generations the
benefits of an enduring resource of wilderness.
16 U.S.C. § 1131(a) (2018).
219
See, e.g., GENE DRIVES ON THE HORIZON, supra note 12, at 64–65 (identifying and discussing moral concerns surrounding genetic engineering and referencing Splicing Life: The Social
and Ethical Issues of Genetic Engineering with Human Beings, a “seminal report” issued by the
President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research in 1982); Johnjoe McFadden, Genetic Editing Is Like Playing God—And
What’s Wrong with That?, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 2, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/commentis
free/2016/feb/02/genetic-editing-playing-god-children-british-scientists-embryos-dna-diseases [https://
perma.cc/XMS9-BXY9] (“The opponents are right. We are indeed playing God with our genes.
But it is a good thing because God, nature or whatever we want to call the agencies that have
made us, often get it wrong and it’s up to us to correct those mistakes.”).
220
Gene Editing: A CBC Interview of Margaret Somerville and Julian Savulescu, PRACTICAL
ETHICS (Dec. 7, 2015), http://blog.practicalethics.ox.ac.uk/2015/12/gene-editing-a-cbc-interviewof-margaret-somerville-and-julian-savulescu/ [https://perma.cc/99M6-V7VC] (noting that until
2015 “there was almost universal agreement . . . that humans have a right to come into existence
with their own unique genetic heritage and other humans have no right to alter them, to design
them”).
221
See, e.g., Eileen M. Kane, Human Genome Editing: An Evolving Regulatory Climate, 57
JURIMETRICS J. 301, 315−18 (2017) (discussing arguments for banning human germline editing);
Collins, supra note 64 (noting “serious and unquantifiable safety issues, ethical issues presented
by altering the germline in a way that affects the next generation without their consent, and a current lack of compelling medical applications justifying the use of CRISPR/Cas9 in embryos”).
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demonstrate that editing the germline of a human embryo raises concerns
that extend beyond risk management. 222
Concerns regarding human rights, environmental justice, distributional
impacts, intergeneration equity, consumer choice, and animal rights reflect
additional perspectives regarding biotechnology governance. 223 Those who
may not advocate for a ban on GMOs but still call for labeling represent an
additional perspective in the biotechnology debate—consumer choice. Labeling and other transparency measures allow stakeholders to use purchasing power to determine whether to support an approach to agriculture or
medicine, to reject uses that are counter to their understandings of the proper role of humans in the ecosystem, to support smaller industry players who
may not have the resources to license an emerging technology or navigate
the regulatory system, or simply to avoid products that they consider distasteful. 224
222
See, e.g., HUMAN GENOME EDITING, supra note 26, at 5−6 (advocating limiting human
trials to only “to the most compelling circumstances, [to] subject [them] to a comprehensive oversight framework that would protect the research subjects and their descendants, and [to institute]
sufficient safeguards . . . to protect against inappropriate expansion to uses that are less compelling
or less well understood”); Collins, supra note 64 (referring to “strong arguments against engaging
in [human germline editing] . . . includ[ing] the serious and unquantifiable safety issues, ethical
issues presented by altering the germline in a way that affects the next generation without their
consent, and a current lack of compelling medical applications justifying the use of CRISPR/Cas9
in embryos”).
223
See, e.g., MICHAEL BESS, OUR GRANDCHILDREN REDESIGNED: LIFE IN THE BIOENGINEERED SOCIETY OF THE NEAR FUTURE 87–89 (2015) (identifying unequal access to genetic
enhancements as potentially creating a new, permanent type of caste system); BERNARD E.
ROLLIN, THE FRANKENSTEIN SYNDROME: ETHICAL AND SOCIAL ISSUES IN THE GENETIC ENGINEERING OF ANIMALS 18–21 (1995) (stating that science and genetic engineering inherently require value judgments); Kuzma & Rawls, supra note 40, at 281 (“Humanity’s ability to alter
populations within ecosystems through genetic engineering raises issues associated with biodiversity and conservation that, in turn, may affect the abilities of current and future generations to use
and enjoy the benefits of the natural world.”); see also Jonathan H. Adler, Compelled Commercial
Speech and the Consumer “Right to Know,” 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 421, 458–59 (2016) (stating that
“[m]any policymakers and activist organizations argue that consumers have a right to know
whether food products contain, or were manufactured with, ingredients that were produced with
these modern genetic engineering techniques”); Carmen G. Gonzalez, Genetically Modified Organisms and Justice: The International Environmental Justice Implications of Biotechnology, 19
GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 583, 604–05 (2007) (describing the “environmental justice” perspective that the import of genetically-modified products into developing countries risks an increase in
socioeconomic inequality); UNESCO, UNIVERSAL DECLARATION ON THE HUMAN GENOME AND
HUMAN RIGHTS art. 11 (1997) (calling for a ban on “[p]ractices which are contrary to human
dignity, such as reproductive cloning of human beings” and calling for international cooperation
“to ensure that the principles set out in this Declaration are respected”).
224
Cass R. Sunstein, On Mandatory Labeling, with Special Reference to Genetically Modified
Foods, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1043, 1077 (2017) (citing Sydney E. Scott et al., Evidence for Absolute
Moral Opposition to Genetically Modified Food in the United States, 11 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI.
316, 317 (2016)); see Peck, supra note 40, at 316 (noting complaints by “small private and public
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The perspectives described above are not necessarily mutually exclusive of one another. A stakeholder may hold numerous viewpoints at once,
such as a general apprehension about decentralized decision making regarding the use of gene drives, appreciation that certain genetic engineering applications may foster greater environmental benefits, and a belief that scientists should continue to pursue gene therapies to address severe genetic disorders, provided appropriate ethical and risk management protections are in
place. The key takeaway for biotechnology governance is not that policy
should prioritize one viewpoint over others, but rather that the current debate reflects these competing viewpoints and that existing regulatory
schemes offer models for accommodating multiple perspectives.
IV. INCORPORATING A NATURAL RESOURCES FRAMEWORK INTO
BIOTECHNOLOGY GOVERNANCE
The scientific advances allowing gene editing are new, but the challenges with balancing competing considerations regarding the use and alteration of natural resources are not. 225 Focusing on threshold questions regarding values, irreversibility, and the public good, the debate over gene
editing governance reflects longstanding debates over natural resource
management. The nation’s strategies for balancing conservation, preservation, and numerous other uses of federal lands, wildlife, plants, water, and
minerals have dealt with similar issues for well over a century. 226 Gene editing adds a new, albeit complex, dimension to these existing debates by expanding the tools available to alter public and private resources.
Natural resource management offers a new conceptual model for biotechnology governance that moves beyond a risk-based, case by case approach. Incorporating a natural resource management perspective into biotechnology governance would provide a frame of reference for considering
gene editing and its implications through the lens of public and private relaboratories” that the current biotechnology regulatory system “is so difficult to navigate that
many are discouraged from pursuing biotechnology research”); Jacob S. Sherkow, How Much Is a
CRISPR Patent License Worth?, FORBES (Feb. 21, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jacob
sherkow/2017/02/21/how-much-is-a-crispr-patent-license-worth/#7fe3b6e56b77 [https://perma.cc/
7YBX-ZBCW] (analyzing the likely value of an exclusive CRISPR patent).
225
Purdy, supra note 207, at 186−89; see RODERICK FRAZIER NASH, WILDERNESS AND THE
AMERICAN MIND 23–43 (4th ed. 2001) (detailing the efforts by early American settlers to use
natural resources and hold dominion over the land rather than preserve its natural state).
226
See Purdy, supra note 207, at 199–203 (noting the rise of the Sierra Club in 1892 and its
publication of material describing natural landscapes). United States laws addressing natural resource management are as old as the country itself, but the contemporary conflicts regarding use,
conservation, and preservation emerged in the late 1800s as the federal government shifted away
from its previous policy of transferring federal lands to the states. Id. at 199–200, 205–06.
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sources for which there are conflicting perspectives regarding appropriate
uses and preservation. Although existing laws do not contemplate the ability
to reorder ecosystems via gene editing, there is an established regulatory
system designed to address risks of extinction, accommodate competing
ideologies regarding resource use, and incorporate interests of future generations when considering irreversible decisions regarding natural resources—all issues that are implicated by gene editing. 227
Federal lands policies, for example, have evolved to manage conflicting interests and values, identifying appropriate uses and allocating resources. 228 As Professor Jedediah Purdy notes, federal resource policies
now reflect a combination of ideologies that emerged at different times in
U.S. history. 229 Together, these policies simultaneously view the public
good as utilizing resources to promote the country’s economic growth, rely
on technocratic management to balance competing resource uses, prioritize
conservation, recreation, and preservation of the nation’s lands, and recognize the complex interactions necessary to maintain a healthy ecosystem. 230
At times, natural resource statutes include precommitments to refrain
from certain uses due to the characteristics of the resource(for example, national monuments and national parks), concerns regarding irreversible impacts (for example, protecting endangered species), or prioritizing nonuse
values over other potential uses (for example, wilderness areas). National
Wilderness Areas, National Parks, National Forests, National Monuments,
and National Recreation Areas each have distinct statutory and regulatory
criteria for designation, access, and resource use based on the characteristics
227

See, e.g., Amy Joi O’Donoghue, State Wildlife Board Opposes Bears Ears Monument in
Letter to Feds, KSL.COM (Aug. 16, 2016), https://www.ksl.com/?sid=41096372&nid=148 [https://
perma.cc/7NR2-99HZ] (discussing opposition to the Bears Ears National Monument due to the
“area’s importance to wildlife and wildlife-based recreation”). Designated wilderness areas, national monuments, and national wildlife refuges each represent a precommitment to restrict resource extraction despite the potential for local and state economic benefits from other uses. Id.
228
See, e.g., JAMES RASBAND ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCES LAW AND POLICY 45 (3d ed.
2016) (stating that “competition over scarce natural resources inevitably causes a clash of competing interests”); Jan G. Laitos & Thomas A. Carr, The Transformation on Public Lands, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 140, 144 (1999) (noting the tension between preservation and recreation); Jan G. Laitos
& Rachael B. Gamble, The Problem with Wilderness, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 503, 505 (2008)
(describing the rise of recreation and conservation goals, and the conflicts among these uses and
different uses of undeveloped lands); J.B. Ruhl & Robert L. Fischman, Adaptive Management in
the Courts, 95 MINN. L. REV. 424, 436 (2010) (stating that “natural resource law is as much the
management of conflict as it is the management of public lands, waters, or species”); Walter
Rusinek, Balancing Competing Interests: A Natural Resources Law Primer, ARIZ. ATT’Y, Mar.
1995, at 24–29 (describing the tension and balance in natural resources law between use and
preservation of natural resources).
229
Purdy, supra note 207, at 173−74.
230
See id. at 173–74, 208 (detailing the impacts of federal resource policies).
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of the lands and resources contained therein. 231 For example, the Federal
Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 instructs the Bureau of Land
Management to balance “recreation, range, timber, minerals, watershed,
wildlife and fish resources” as well as “natural scenic, scientific and historical values.” 232 The management practices must ensure “sustained yield” and
protect current and future use. 233 The Organic Act of 1916 requires the Park
Service to achieve the conflicting goals of conserving “the scenery, natural
and historic objects, and wild life” while also allowing for recreation, and
leaving the resources “unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.” 234 In other circumstances, Congress specifies how to resolve competing uses at the outset, such as the Wilderness Act prohibiting commercial
enterprises, permanent roads, motorized vehicles, and manmade structures,
while permitting continued livestock grazing. 235
Federal land management also generally requires consideration of ecological impacts. In some instances, these considerations take the form of
balancing ecological impacts with other statutory goals, such as multiple
use. 236 In other instances, ecological considerations take priority. Specifying
the relative importance of ecological impacts provides important guidance
to regulators and, similar to requirements to consider the interests of future
generations, outlines substantive requirements that may be subject to judicial review. These requirements operate in conjunction with NEPA’s procedural mandate to evaluate actions that may have significant environmental
impacts. 237
Strategies for resolving natural resource conflicts are far from perfect.
Intense disputes persist regarding species preservation, land preservation,
and access to resources. 238 Taken as a whole, however, the system of natural
231

Wilderness Act, Pub. L. No. 88-577, 78 Stat. 890 (1964) (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. § 1131 (2018)); Organic Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-235, 39 Stat. 535 (1916) (codified as
amended at 54 U.S.C. § 100101 (2018)); National Forest Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-588, 90 Stat. 2949 (1976) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1600 (2018)); Antiquities Act,
Pub. L. No. 59-209, 34 Stat. 225 (1906) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 431 (2018)). This is
far from a complete list. Federal agencies may have multiple land classifications under their jurisdiction. See, e.g., Garett R. Rose, “Reservations of Like Character”—The Origins and Benefits of
the National Park System’s Classification Hierarchy, 121 PENN ST. L. REV. 355, 362–71 (2016)
(identifying land classifications under National Park Service jurisdiction).
232
43 U.S.C. § 1702(c) (2018).
233
Id. §§ 1701(a)(2), 1702(h).
234
54 U.S.C. § 100101(a) (2018).
235
16 U.S.C. §§ 1133(c), (d)(4).
236
See, e.g., id. § 1611(a) (“[A]ny such planned departure must be consistent with the multiple-use management objectives of the land management plan”).
237
42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2018).
238
See, e.g., Kirk Siegler, With National Monuments Under Review, Bears Ears Is Focus of
Fierce Debate, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (May 5, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/05/05/526860725/
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resource governance requires consideration of the tradeoffs associated with
altering natural systems and balancing competing values. The range of natural resource statutes thus provides models for considering categories of gene
editing applications in terms of their economic, ecological, and cultural impacts, including risks, benefits, and values-based considerations that extend
beyond the risk-benefit framework.
Explicitly incorporating additional criteria to biotechnology governance would allow policy discussions to move beyond the product versus
process focus. Instead, the focus would shift from product to potential for
natural resource impacts. This change would allow a multifaceted regulatory approach that is better prepared to consider the range of complex ecological and distributional impacts that will likely arise due to gene editing.
Considering the values implicated by the prospect of altering organisms or
eradicating species properly situates concerns about safety and risk within
the broader context of ideologies underlying the biotechnology debate.
Few may question the benefits of eradicating a non-native species of
mosquito to prevent spreading the Zika virus, a virus that can cause severe
birth defects, including microcephaly, when passed from pregnant women
to embryos, or dengue fever, “a leading cause of illness and death in the
tropics and subtropics” for which there is no vaccine to prevent infection, if
the eradication method does not harm humans or the environment. 239 That
acceptance may not extend to other uses that do not address such pressing
health concerns.
Requiring government officials to consider additional criteria would
likely face opposition. Such a shift would incorporate the narrative of engineering evolution and extinction as a starting point, potentially leading to
more stringent regulatory oversight in some circumstances. Proponents of
minimal oversight of gene-edited organisms may worry that such a shift
would result in unnecessary regulation and permitting delays, thus stifling
innovation, restricting competitiveness of U.S. biotechnology firms, and
delaying or denying benefits to society.
with-national-monuments-under-review-bears-ears-is-focus-of-fierce-debate [https://perma.cc/4SLVQE6K] (describing tension over the designation of monuments and use of federal lands in Utah);
see also Jan G. Laitos, The Multiple to Dominant Use Paradigm Shift in Natural Resources Management, 24 J. LAND, RES., & ENVTL. L. 221, 227 (2004) (analyzing conflicts among recreational
users of federal lands).
239
Dengue, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/dengue/
index.html [https://perma.cc/VXS7-E4Z5]. The Aedes aegypti mosquito, the mosquito strain targeted in the proposed Key Haven trial, is “the most important transmitter or vector of dengue
viruses” in the Western Hemisphere. Dengue: Frequently Asked Questions: What Is Dengue?,
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/dengue/faqfacts/index.html
[https://perma.cc/TT72-GVXF]; Questions About Zika, supra note 3.
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Broad-based opposition to the notion of additional regulatory oversight
is misplaced. First, delays and restrictions are an acceptable outcome if they
result in a more effective regulatory approach for an emerging technology
that could simultaneously offer dramatic benefits and risks. Furthermore,
requiring federal agencies to consider criteria like the interests of future
generations does not mandate a uniform approach for all gene editing applications nor a particular outcome. It is possible, for example, to realize
health benefits of gene therapies, eradicate certain disease-carrying insects,
and allow the sale of certain ecologically benign agricultural products without accepting a laissez-faire approach to gene editing. It is also possible to
maintain different restrictions for research and deployment phases of gene
editing, and to implement an adaptive approach to resource decisions that
allows regulatory limits to shift as new information becomes available. 240
Where timeliness is crucial, such as preventing the rapid spread of a highly
contagious disease, regulations could allow for expedited review or provide
exemptions. As it stands, the limited regulatory inquiries required by existing law foreclose many of these considerations.
This section identifies three general strategies that may serve as a starting point for amending biotechnology governance to incorporate lessons of
effective natural resource management: balancing competing values; providing mechanisms for participatory governance; and implementing conservation strategies. Taken together or individually, these measures provide a
foundation for a more robust regulatory scheme to address the fundamental
questions presented by rapid advancements in biotechnology. Federal agencies could implement some of the ideas presented in this section via administrative action. The FDA proposal to expand the definition of animal drug
demonstrates that interpretation of statutory language may change as technologies evolve. 241 Agencies could also increase opportunities for public engagement under current statutory authority. Other ideas described below
would require legislative action, such as explicitly incorporating impacts on
future generations as part of an approval process or distinguishing between
gene editing that addresses acute health concerns versus those that offer
benefits of convenience or aesthetics. The discussion introduces options to
facilitate a broader approach to biotechnology governance but does not go
into detail regarding implementation.

240

See Ruhl & Fischman, supra note 228, at 436−43 (detailing adaptive management practices for natural resources).
241
See FDA GE ANIMALS DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 71, at 6–7 (noting each specific
DNA or genomic alteration is a “new animal drug” subject to regulation).
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A. Explicit Identification of Values-Based Considerations
As the natural resource statutes described above demonstrate, Congress can define, and federal agencies can address, broad, values-based language that recognizes multiple interests involved in decisions regarding resource management. The statutes may grant wide discretion to agencies
making resource decisions. 242 Specifying governance criteria in a statute,
even if by broad language, however, requires agencies to give them due
consideration and explain their rationales. 243 In the process, the specified
criteria may also incorporate, and potentially solidify, cultural norms. 244
The debate over human genome alterations is the most prevalent example of explicit values-based limitations on gene editing and other biotechnology applications. 245 Gene therapies for medical purposes, including
those utilizing gene editing techniques, face a higher level of regulatory
scrutiny by the FDA than genetic alterations applied to animals, plants, and
insects. Gene therapies are also subject to oversight by the National Institute
of Health’s Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee ( “RAC”), institutional
review boards, and biosafety committees. 246 A 1996 budget amendment,
referred to as the Dickey-Wicker amendment, prohibits federal funding for
research on human embryos or for research that results in the destruction of
human embryos. 247 National Institute of Health Guidelines prohibit the
RAC from “entertain[ing] proposals for germ line alteration[].” 248 The RAC
242
See S. Utah Wilderness All. v. Dabney, 222 F.3d 819, 826 (10th Cir. 2000) (interpreting
the phrase “unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations” in the Organic Act).
243
See id. at 829 (remanding to determine whether the National Park Service’s interpretation
of “unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations” was reasonable).
244
See John D. Leshy, Legal Wilderness: Its Past and Some Speculations on Its Future, 44
ENVTL. L. 549, 551, 622 (2014) (noting the symbiotic relationship between legal and cultural
perceptions of natural resource preservation).
245
See Collins, supra note 64 (explaining “[t]he concept of altering the human germline in
embryos for clinical purposes has been debated over many years from many different perspectives, and has been viewed almost universally as a line that should not be crossed” and discussing
arguments against human genome editing, including “the serious and unquantifiable safety issues,
ethical issues presented by altering the germline in a way that affects the next generation without
their consent, and a current lack of compelling medical applications justifying the use of CRISPR/
Cas9 in embryos”); see also GENE DRIVES ON THE HORIZON, supra note 12, at 60 (stating that
“[t]he most prominent moral questions about genetic engineering have always been about its prospective benefits and harms to human beings”).
246
NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., OVERSIGHT AND REVIEW OF CLINICAL GENE
TRANSFER PROTOCOLS: ASSESSING THE ROLE OF THE RECOMBINANT DNA ADVISORY COMMITTEE 77 (2014).
247
Balanced Budget Downpayment Act, I, Pub. L. No. 104-99, § 128, 110 Stat. 26, 34 (1996).
248
NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, NIH GUIDELINES FOR RESEARCH INVOLVING RECOMBINANT
ON SYNTHETIC NUCLEIC ACID MOLECULES 100 (Apr. 2016), https://osp.od.nih.gov/wp-content/
uploads/2013/06/NIH_Guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/HGC2-URYL].
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reviews and monitors protocols for experimental gene therapy clinical trials
and provides a venue for public comment and review. 249 Other gene therapy
oversight bodies do not involve the general public.
Like other areas of biotechnology, gene therapy research is advancing
quickly. The FDA approved a gene therapy for the first time in August
2017. 250 An FDA advisory committee recommended approval of a second
gene therapy one month later. 251 The National Institute of Health prohibits
federal funding for human germline modifications, but the use of CRISPR
for non-inheritable treatments is underway. 252 The RAC recently approved a
protocol for the first clinical trial of a CRISPR gene therapy in humans. 253
The trial, involving CRISPR edits of human T-cells, is privately funded and
not aimed at germline modifications. 254 In August 2017, another group of
scientists announced the successful editing of a human embryos to address a
genetic blood disorder—the first successful human germline editing involving U.S. scientists. 255
The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine have responded to these rapid developments with numerous reports on genetic engineering, including a 2017 report focused directly on human germline editing. 256 The report concludes that if human germline editing were to occur,
“it would be essential to limit these trials only to the most compelling cir249

Id. at 23, 31, 37.
Press Release, Food & Drug Admin., FDA Approval Brings First Gene Therapy to the United States (Aug. 30, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm
574058.htm [https://perma.cc/AF23-SVFV].
251
Laurie McGinley, Novel Cancer Treatment Wins Endorsement of FDA Advisers, WASH.
POST (July 12, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-your-health/wp/2017/07/12/novelcancer-treatment-wins-endorsement-of-fda-advisers/ [https://perma.cc/SY8J-L36M].
252
NIH GUIDELINES, supra note 248, at 100.
253
Collins, supra note 64; Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Recombinant DNA Advisory
Committee, Minutes of Meeting, 14–15, 26 (June 21–22, 2016) (minutes available at https://osp.od.
nih.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Minutes_RAC_Jun2016_508_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/FM3NSLEC]).
254
Sara Reardon, First CRISPR Clinical Trial Gets Green Light From US Panel, NATURE
(June 22, 2016), http://www.nature.com/news/first-crispr-clinical-trial-gets-green-light-from-uspanel-1.20137 [https://perma.cc/C4NL-W2WD].
255
Ma et al., supra note 30; Pam Belluck, In Breakthrough, Scientists Edit a Dangerous Mutation from Genes in Human Embryos, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/08/02/science/gene-editing-human-embryos.html [https://perma.cc/62G5-UCWU].
256
See generally NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., GENETICALLY ENGINEERED ORGANISMS, WILDLIFE, AND HABITAT: A WORKSHOP SUMMARY (2008); NAT. RESEARCH COUNCIL
COMM. ON IDENTIFYING AND ASSESSING UNINTENDED EFFECTS OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED
FOODS ON HUMAN HEALTH, SAFETY OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED FOODS: APPROACHES TO
ASSESSING UNINTENDED HEALTH EFFECTS (2004); HUMAN GENOME EDITING, supra note 26;
GENE DRIVES ON THE HORIZON, supra note 12; GENETICALLY-ENGINEERED CROPS, supra note
198; GM PEST-PROTECTED PLANTS, supra note 50.
250
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cumstances, to subject them to a comprehensive oversight framework that
would protect the research subjects and their descendants, and to institute
safeguards against inappropriate expansion into uses that are less compelling or well understood.” 257 The National Academies’ proposed regulatory
framework includes the following elements:
(i) absence of reasonable alternatives; (ii) restriction to preventing
a serious disease or condition; (iii) restriction to editing genes that
have been convincingly demonstrated to cause or to strongly predispose to the disease or condition; (iv) restriction to converting
such genes to versions that are prevalent in the population and are
known to be associated with ordinary health with little or no evidence of adverse effects; availability of credible pre-clinical
and/or clinical data on risks and potential health benefits of the
procedures; (v) ongoing, rigorous oversight during clinical trials
of the effects of the procedure on the health and safety of the research participants; (vi) comprehensive plans for long-term, multigenerational follow-up that still respect personal autonomy; (vii)
maximum transparency consistent with patient privacy; (viii) continued reassessment of both health and societal benefits and risks,
with broad ongoing participation and input by the public; and (ix)
reliable oversight mechanisms to prevent extension to uses other
than preventing a serious disease or condition. 258
The report recognizes that these criteria are open for interpretation. 259 The
authors also note the difficulty inherent in defining concepts such as “enhancement,” “reasonable alternative,” and “serious disease condition.” 260
The same suggested criteria for strict oversight of human germline editing could apply to non-human gene editing applications currently underway. This is not to suggest that concerns regarding human and non-human
genetic modifications are on par with one another. Implementation may differ depending on the human or non-human uses, but the National Academies’ recommendations for allowing human gene editing while addressing
moral and ethical concerns are applicable in both contexts. For example,
257

HUMAN GENOME EDITING, supra note 26, at 7.
Id. at 7−8.
259
Id. at 8 (noting that stakeholders could view the criteria as (1) effectively “promoting wellbeing within a framework of due care and responsible science,” (2) providing a framework “strict
enough to prevent the harms” or (3) satisfying opponents of gene editing because the criteria are
“so strict that they would have the effect of preventing all clinical trials involving germline genome editing”).
260
Id. at 8−9.
258
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biotechnology policy could limit the use of gene editing to purposes where
there is a convincing public benefit. Laws could require credible data on the
risks and potential benefits of releasing genetically-modified organisms.
Approval could be coupled with requirements to engage in ongoing, rigorous oversight of the modified organisms and their ecosystem impacts. Release could also be conditioned on the availability of effective safeguards to
prevent unanticipated impacts. 261 Regulators could require comprehensive
plans for long-term studies in a manner accessible to government agencies
and the general public. Companies releasing genetically-modified organisms could be subject to continued reassessment of the benefits and risks to
public health and the environment, with ongoing participation and input by
the public. Laws could create a presumption against genetic alterations to
animals, plants, or other organisms when other reasonable alternatives exist. 262 Approval could also require demonstrations of reliable oversight
mechanisms to ensure the genetically-modified organisms are released and
managed in the approved manner.
Even maintaining the current focus on human and agriculture impacts,
biotechnology governance is too limited to protect those interests in the new
CRISPR era. Gene editing may permanently impact ecosystems in a manner
that affects public health (for example, creating ecosystem changes that increase the risk of other disease vectors) or alters flora or fauna in a manner
that impacts local resource-dependent industries (for example, creating tree
or animal species that out-compete indigenous varieties). 263 There is a long
history of seemingly benign ecosystem changes producing unforeseen impacts. The increasing prevalence of ticks due to a lack of natural predators
for their hosts, the introduction of kudzu to manage erosion, and the loss of
topsoil and increased flooding due to deforestation are but a few notable
examples. 264
261
Kevin M. Esvelt, An Analysis of Gene Drive Risks and Safeguards, SCULPTING NATURE,
http://www.sculptingevolution.org/genedrives/safeguards [https://perma.cc/8GEX-5KBF].
262
Doug Gurian-Sherman, Genetically Engineered Crops in the Real World—Bt Corn, Insecticide Use, and Honey Bees, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (Jan. 10, 2012), https://blog.ucsusa.
org/doug-gurian-sherman/genetically-engineered-crops-in-the-real-world-bt-corn-insecticide-useand-honeybees-2?_ga=2.4208688.243407572.1534856677-940336054.1534856677 [https://perma.
cc/L76L-9Z8U] (identifying crop breeding and changes to farm management as alternatives to genetically-engineered crop).
263
See, e.g., Kenneth A. Oye et al., Regulating Gene Drives, 345 SCIENCE 626, 627 (2014)
(noting the potential for gene drives to produce “unintended ecological side effects”).
264
See, e.g., Derek H Alderman & Donna G’Segner Alderman, Kudzu: A Tale of Two Vines,
7 SOUTHERN CULTURES 49, 52 (2001) (stating that kudzu went from being a “highly valued resource to lowly pest”); Corey J. A. Bradshaw et al., Global Evidence That Deforestation Amplifies
Flood Risk and Severity in the Developing World, 13 GLOBAL CHANGE BIOLOGY 2379, 2380–81
(2007) (describing evidence that deforestation directly impacts flooding); Sean M. Moore et al.,
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Implementation could vary depending on the organisms involved, the
circumstances motivating the proposal to use genetic engineering, and the
types of risks and uncertainties presented by the genetic engineering and
non-genetic engineering alternatives. In some cases, the requirement to pursue alternatives prior to deploying genetic engineering could allow exceptions if the gene editing option is found to be safe and superior to conventional options. In other cases, where risks are high or core values are implicated, the requirement could be more restrictive. 265 The approach could also
distinguish between laboratory experimentation and deployment of geneedited products, allowing research and testing to continue.
Policymakers could look to federal lands statutes such as the National
Park Organic Act, the Federal Land Policy and Management Act, and the
National Forest Management Act as models for incorporating additional
values-based considerations into the biotechnology statutory framework. 266
For example, just as current federal land management decisions impact the
interests of future generations, future generations also have an interest in
how biotechnology impacts humans and ecosystems. Explicit consideration
of these interests as a part of biotechnology oversight would provide important symbolic and substantive (in other words, judicially reviewable)
criteria to guide decision making. 267 Updates to the biotechnology governance framework could also incorporate substantive requirements to evaluate
potential ecological impacts of gene editing applications that expand beyond the procedural requirements of NEPA. 268
Applying this inquiry in the context of genetically-modified mosquitoes, regulators would consider the societal benefit of releasing the modified organism and arguments regarding the availability of effective alternatives. Genetic modifications to eradicate the Zika virus may be approved,
but modifications to eradicate or control non-disease carrying insects may
not. The inquiry could also distinguish between the types of diseases a mosquito species may carry, weigh those risks with the risks to other species in
the ecosystem, and require ongoing public engagement and risk assessment.
The process could also allow for expedited review in circumstances such as
Predators Indirectly Control Vector-Borne Disease: Linking Predator-Prey and Host-Pathogen
Models, 7 J. OF ROYAL SOC’Y: INTERFACE 161, 161 (2010) (noting the relationships between
disease carrying vectors and their ecological communities).
265
This discussion is intentionally general and identifies possible governance strategies that
could place limits on gene editing rather than propose specific approaches.
266
16 U.S.C. § 1600 (2018); 43 U.S.C. § 1702(c) (2018); 54 U.S.C. § 100101 (2018).
267
See 54 U.S.C. § 100101(a) (requiring that resources be left “unimpaired for the enjoyment
of future generations”).
268
See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2018) (listing NEPA’s procedural mandate to evaluate actions
that may have significant environmental impacts).
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the Zika virus. The environmental assessment for the Key Haven field trial
already includes many of these elements. 269 The natural resource management framework could shift the inquiry from procedural review of risks to
substantive instructions to the regulators assessing the risks. Decisions
could then be judicially reviewable, increasing societal oversight for deployment of genetic sciences.
The hornless cow may or may not receive regulatory approval under
the proposed framework. 270 If the justification for approving the modified
dairy cow is increasing safety for cows and farmers, the inquiry would assess what causes the risk. One obvious alternative to modifying the DNA of
dairy cattle is to require greater space for the cattle. That outcome may raise
costs, which would force agencies to weigh economic interests against the
implications of gene editing. To the extent an agency is prioritizing one criterion over another—for example, short-term economic gains over longterm moral or ecological concerns regarding gene editing—the process
should be explicit and transparent. The natural resource framework for gene
editing could require it.
This approach has multiple benefits for effective biotechnology governance. It may avoid risks by limiting the number of discretionary releases
of gene-edited products. It may reduce opposition to biotechnology where
there is a more robust regulatory system that identifies benefits and risks
and provides for stakeholder engagement. It may provide a market signal
that guides biotechnology investment toward the most beneficial uses, as
well as enhance support for gene editing when it is the only viable option.
Consideration of value choices may also refine the use of precautionary
principles when determining how to proceed with a biotechnology product. 271
There are also potential downsides, such as impacts on investment,
slower timelines for product development, and potentially allowing companies engaged in gene editing in countries with less oversight to achieve a
competitive advantage over U.S. firms. 272 Government officials incorporating the natural resource framework into biotechnology governance would
need to consider these concerns. The multi-faceted approach to natural re-

269

FDA MOSQUITO ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 7, at 17.
See DAIRY ANIMAL WELL-BEING, supra note 117 (detailing Recombinetics Inc.’s proposal to genetically-engineer hornless cows).
271
Kaebnick et al., supra note 9, at 710–11 (noting that precaution requires consideration of
questions regarding harms, benefits, distributional impacts, and governance regarding new biotechnology products).
272
See id. at 710 (noting various risks relating to use of gene drives).
270
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source management demonstrates that it is possible to tailor government
oversight to specific resources, locations, and values.
Creating a common set of criteria based on a combination of riskassessment and non-risk values would be an important step in breaking
down the process-versus-product distinction. 273 If the inquiry determines
that a type of gene editing does not pass threshold questions of acceptability, it may be unnecessary to proceed to risk analysis. This stage may identify applications subject to the highest level of restrictions—equivalent to
wilderness areas or national monuments. 274 In the genome context, these
“protected spaces” may include categories of gene editing such as editing
for aesthetic enhancements or deploying gene drives to eradicate nonharmful insects, plants, or animals.
B. Participatory Governance
Many natural resource management regimes rely on varying degrees of
public engagement to inform the decision-making process, going beyond
formal notice-and-comment requirements. 275 These strategies include engaging individual actors affected by natural resource statutes, creating local
advisory committees, and soliciting input when developing plans for parks
or forests. 276 These efforts contribute to more informed management strate-

273
See Rascoff & Revesz, supra note 192 (noting the tradeoffs required to determine the party
at risk, what the risks are, and what risks are unacceptable).
274
See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131−1136 (creating a national wilderness preservation system); Mark
Squillace et al., Presidents Lack the Authority to Abolish or Diminish National Monuments, 103
VA. L. REV. ONLINE 55, 55–56 (2017), http://www.virginialawreview.org/sites/virginialawreview.
org/files/Hecht%20PDF.pdf [https://perma.cc/DW4K-YQFA] (noting that only Congress has the
authority to get rid of national monuments).
275
See, e.g., Mark Squillace, Embracing a Civic Republican Tradition in Natural Resources
Decision-Making, in THE EVOLUTION OF NATURAL RESOURCES LAW AND POLICY 195, 209−18
(Lawrence J. MacDonnell & Sarah F. Bates eds., 2010) (detailing various public engagement
efforts including formal and informal hearings, town hall meetings, open houses, workshops and
consensus-based processes, and personal meetings). Some federal natural resource statutes require
agencies to work with local authorities when developing management plans. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1600–1687 (2018) (detailing the National Forest Management Act and the ability of local authorities to participate in program development); 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701−1787 (2018) (detailing the
Federal Land Policy and Management Act and the ability of local authorities to participate in
program development).
276
An example of engaging individual actors affected by natural resources is through a Habitat Conservation Plan under the ESA. See Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1539
(2018) (detailing the process to implement a Habitat Conservation Plan); Alejandro E. Camacho,
Can Regulation Evolve? Lessons from a Study in Maladaptive Management, 55 UCLA L. REV.
293, 298 (2007) (referring to the Habitat Conservation Plan as “one of the earliest experiments in
regulatory innovation”).
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gies. They may also reduce controversies by allowing affected citizens to
participate in the decision-making process. 277
Stakeholder engagement is a particular challenge in the biotechnology
context. 278 Reports and scholarly articles discussing developments in genetic
engineering frequently call for more robust public engagement and education,
but neglect to specify how to accomplish those goals. 279 Although there are
mechanisms for public participation in the biotechnology regulatory system,
they often occur within the existing risk-based framework and do not accommodate the range of competing interests discussed above. 280 Creating a
broader governance framework that expands beyond risk-based considerations could allow decisionmakers to implement engagement strategies tailored to the different types of gene editing applications. In the absence of an
expanded framework, engagement is limited primarily to whether stakeholders accept data regarding the safety of a genetically-engineered product. 281
More robust government-led engagement efforts could contribute by
expanding opportunities for stakeholders to comment on appropriate uses of
gene editing and available alternatives, including non-risk-based arguments
277

See, e.g., Robert L. Fischman, What Is Natural Resources Law?, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 717,
734−36 (2007) (discussing how “place-based collaboration” aids in reaching a decision that caters
to the needs of a given area, and thus is generally more favorable to “command-and-control” regulations); Sheila Foster, Environmental Justice in an Era of Devolved Collaboration, 26 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 459, 474 (2002) (“In bringing together traditional adversaries (e.g., landowners,
resource extractors, environmentalists, and federal agencies) to seek solutions of mutual benefit,
these ad hoc collaborative partnerships strive to elevate the pursuit of practical, multi-stakeholder
plans above the conflict, delays, and administrative red tape so characteristic of mandated planning processes and regulatory programs.”).
278
Kuzma & Besley, supra note 213, at 149.
279
See, e.g., HUMAN GENOME EDITING, supra note 26, at 9 (“Precisely because of the difficulty of evaluating the benefit of an enhancement to an individual given the large role of subjective factors, public discussion is needed to inform the regulatory risk/benefit analyses that underlie
decisions to permit research or approve marketing. Public discussion also is needed to explore
social impacts, both real and anticipated, as governance policy for such applications is developed.”); NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, PUBLIC DIALOGUE ON GENOME EDITING: WHY?
WHEN? WHO? 1, 4 (May 2016), http://nuffieldbioethics.org/wp-content/uploads/Public-Dialogueon-Genome-Editing-workshop-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/54B9-Q8E4] [hereinafter PUBLIC DIALOGUE ON GENOME EDITING] (“In papers in major scientific journals and statements from highlevel meetings and conferences, the voices of researchers, funders, and others have joined together
in calling for early and open engagement about genome editing with policy makers and the wider
public.”).
280
See HUMAN GENOME EDITING, supra note 26, at 9−10 (describing the mechanisms for
public participation in the gene-editing debate); Marchant et al., supra note 190, at 727 (stating
that “[e]xisting regulatory frameworks often exclude consideration of social and moral concerns,
ruling them outside the bounds of the jurisdiction of regulatory agencies or reviewing courts”); see
also supra note 185–224 and accompanying text (identifying and discussing the competing interests at stake).
281
See 2017 Update to Coordinated Framework, supra note 41, at 7–8 (describing the riskbased approach to regulating genetically-engineered products).
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for restricting certain types of gene editing. Similar to the federal lands context, these engagement strategies may differ depending on the resources,
and the cultural and ecological implications. 282
Professor Kevin Esvelt and his colleagues offer a promising example
of engaging local communities where gene-edited organisms may be released. 283 Prior to conducting an experiment to control Lyme disease by
releasing white-footed mice whose DNA was altered to make the organisms
“immune to the bacteria that cause Lyme and other tick-borne diseases,”
Esvelt focused on educating local communities about the risks and benefits,
promised to make information gained through the experiment publiclyavailable rather than treat it as proprietary, and committed to forgoing the
experiment if local residents opposed the process. 284 This effort empowers
local residents to participate in decisions regarding the release of genetically-altered organisms and provides information so that each resident can develop an informed opinion.
Referendum-based measures could also help identify values-based
considerations and provide mechanisms for stakeholder engagement. Public
referendums, such as those conducted prior to the Key Haven trial of genetically-modified mosquitoes, allow affected populations to express their
opinions regarding the release of genetically-modified organisms or other
uses of biotechnology techniques. 285 Product labeling may facilitate another
a type of referendum on biotechnology, allowing consumers to “vote with
their checkbooks” by deciding whether to support genetic engineering
through the purchase of engineered products. 286 Product labeling has been a
source of controversy since GMO products first started entering the marketplace. 287 Pursuant to the Coordinated Framework’s focus on products rather
than process, the FDA determined that the use of genetic engineering to
produce a product is not a “material fact” subject to disclosure require282
See Purdy, supra note 207, at 173−74 (describing four historical stages of American interaction with nature arising from shifting cultures and values).
283
Michael Specter, Rewriting the Code of Life, NEW YORKER, Jan. 2, 2017, https://www.
newyorker.com/magazine/2017/01/02/rewriting-the-code-of-life [https://perma.cc/7NHV-AYUQ].
284
Id.
285
See Joseph, supra note 139 (noting that nearly two-thirds of Key Haven residents voted to
opposed the GM mosquito trial and residents in the surrounding county approved it); GMO Mosquito Plan Vote, supra note 138 (describing the process of the non-binding referendum for Kay
Haven residents).
286
See generally Sunstein, supra note 224 (summarizing the debate regarding labeling of
genetically-modified products).
287
See Nan Feng, The Recent Enactment of National Mandatory GMO Labeling Law: Superior to a Voluntary Labeling Scheme but Unlikely to End the Labeling Controversy, 40 SEATTLE
U. L. REV. 821, 827–31 (2017) (describing the national and state level debates regarding labeling
of GMO products).
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ments. 288 Labeling of GMO products will soon become more common. In
2016, Congress amended the Agricultural Marketing Act to require labeling
of genetically-modified food products. 289 It is not clear whether the new law
will cover “foods that are the product of genetic deletions.” 290
Labeling allows consumers to choose whether to purchase geneticallymodified products. Opponents of mandatory labeling argue that it may suggest that the GMO products are unsafe, again restricting the debate to concerns about risk and safety and denying, or dismissing, that concerns may
reflect a larger set of values regarding the appropriate uses of biotechnology. 291 Labeling currently exists for premium products and products where
consumers may be particularly concerned about health risks. 292 Mandatory
labeling for biotechnology products could send an important market signal
regarding public acceptance of genetic engineering, likely a reason that producers of genetically-modified products often oppose labeling requirements.
Elevating the role of referendum-based governance could also have the
positive effect of creating incentives for more effective public education and
engagement. 293 Allowing affected populations to determine whether products or techniques are permitted accepts that approval or rejection may occur for a variety of reasons, some of which are fact-based and some of
which are based on values, fears, or misinformation. 294 Increasing reliance
on referendums or labeling risks turning engagement efforts into public relations battles among interest groups, potentially undermining, rather than
facilitating, efforts to provide objective information. It could result in delaying or preventing release, perhaps an acceptable outcome for emerging
technologies with the potential for irreversible negative impacts. It could
also identify the areas where the public is most willing to accept gene edit288

2017 Update to Coordinated Framework, supra note 41; see Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 321(n) (2018) (noting that the extent that labeling does not disclose
material facts should be considered to determine if labeling is misleading).
289
National Bioengineered Food Disclosure Standard, Pub. L. No. 114-216, 130 Stat. 834,
835, 838 (July 29, 2016) (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1639–1639j).
290
PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE PRODUCTS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 14, at 81.
291
See Feng, supra note 287, at 827 (describing opponents of labeling laws view that these
laws could “demonize GM foods” and inhibit innovation).
292
See Sunstein, supra note 224, at 1052–53 (noting the potential impact that “non-GM”
labeling has on consumer perception of risk).
293
See Kaebnick et al., supra note 9, at 711 (“Any proposed release requires engagement with
relevant publics, fostering attention to the values questions, broadening control over decisions
beyond the community of scientists and engineers, creating an additional layer of review, and
improving scientists’ understanding of potential outcomes.”).
294
See Sunstein, supra note 224, at 1051–55 (detailing market variables that inhibit acceptance of GM products such as consumer demand, incomplete information, and producer behavior in labeling); PUBLIC DIALOGUE ON GENOME EDITING, supra note 279, at 9 (noting the risks of
early dialogue regarding gene editing).
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ing. Both outcomes would inform governance measures as the science of
gene editing evolves and potential uses expand.
C. Conservation Measures
Preservation, conservation, and concerns about irreversibility are recurring themes in natural resource management. Extracting resources, particularly non-renewable resources, foreclose the option to utilize the resources at a later date when supplies may be limited, prices may increase, or
shifts in public opinion would result in different choices. 295 Extracting renewable resources may present similar issues, depending on the time required to replenish the resource or the potential for extraction to alter irreversibly the local ecosystem (for example, deforestation resulting in loss of
top soil).
Resource economists have developed numerous strategies to quantify
the value of different resource uses and gauge public opinions regarding
natural resource extraction. 296 Consideration of use and non-use values, as
well as “option value,” comparing impacts of near-term actions against the
value of preserving choices in the future, are explicitly incorporated into
resource decision making. 297 In particular, option value could provide a useful analytical framework for evaluating arguments for early uses of CRISPR
versus uses that could lead to irreversible impacts on biodiversity, or do not
justify release based on current circumstances because they do not offer
sufficient societal benefits or present unacceptable risks. 298 This approach
would limit the near-term uses of CRISPR, but preserve options to utilize
gene editing in the future if more information is available regarding benefits
and risks or if societal perspectives on gene editing shift.
Prohibiting the use of gene editing in some contexts would not necessarily be permanent, but initial decisions to delay actions could preserve
295

Michael A. Livermore, Patience Is an Economic Virtue: Real Options, Natural Resources,
and Offshore Oil, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 581, 589 (2013).
296
See Catherine M.H. Keske, How to Value Environmental and Non-Market Goods: A Guide
for Legal Professionals, 39 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 423, 423–28 (2011) (detailing the method
to value environmental resources through valuation of both “use and non-use values”).
297
See, e.g., Ohio v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 464 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (requiring
the Department of Interior to consider non-consumptive values in natural resource damage assessment regulations because market valuation alone “will necessarily be incomplete”); Livermore, supra note 295, at 589–90 (defining “real option value” as the value of “information about
the benefits and costs of a project” that has been obtained through delayed decisions).
298
See Sunstein, supra note 224, at 1088 n.189 (citing Anthony C. Fisher, Uncertainty, Irreversibility, and the Timing of Climate Policy 9 (Oct. 2001), http://stephenschneider.stanford.edu/
Publications/PDF_Papers/timingFfisher.pdf [https://perma.cc/B49V-L97M] (describing potential
risk and unforeseeable consequences of GMO and the “option value” of slow decision making).
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options in the event gene editing proves riskier than initially thought, unnecessary due to development of other options, or undesirable due to evolving social norms. Decisions regarding management, use, and preservation
may change as societal values evolve. For example, the National Park Service and the Bureau of Land Management have the discretion to change
uses for areas that they respectively manage, provided the decisions satisfy
judicial review pursuant to their respective authorizing statutes and the Administration Procedure Act. 299 Congress designates national wilderness areas and may reverse those decisions. 300 Questions regarding the ability of the
executive branch to reverse national monument designations have resurfaced under the Trump Administration, but it remains indisputable that
Congress could reverse a monument designation. 301
Although these designations may not be permanent, they create a presumption of conservation or preservation in certain circumstances, as well
as a specified process for altering the management approaches. 302 Congress
could similarly reverse agency decisions in the biotechnology context and
could also specify the circumstances under which agencies can (or should)
alter regulatory restrictions.
Gene editing governance could also establish the equivalent of protected spaces in the genetic engineering context—circumstances where gene
editing is prohibited or limited on a temporary or permanent basis. Additional preservation measures may focus on preserving DNA, maintaining
species, and ecosystems. For example, seed banks and storage facilities for
the DNA of endangered species (gene banks) could contribute to preservation measures in an era of expanding uses to biotechnology to alter species
and ecosystems. These strategies are already utilized to preserve DNA for a
variety of reasons, including research, resilience of food supplies, and maintaining genetic diversity. 303 Preserving unaltered genetic material could po-

299

See 43 U.S.C. § 1702(c) (2018) (requiring the balance of “recreation, range, timber, minerals, watershed, wildlife and fish resources” as well as “natural scenic, scientific and historical
values”); 54 U.S.C. § 100101 (2018) (authorizing the Secretary to regulate the National Park System to “conserve the scenery, natural and historic objects, and wild life” and to enable the preservation of those for the “enjoyment of future generations”).
300
43 U.S.C. § 1782(b).
301
See Squillace, supra note 274 (noting that only Congress has the authority to get rid of
national monuments).
302
For example, the National Forest Management Act specifies aspects of National Forest
management plans, including requirements for public participation. 16 U.S.C. § 1604 (2018).
303
See Victoria Russo, Five Global Seed Banks That Are Protecting Biodiversity, WORLDWATCH INST. BLOG (Oct. 12, 2013), http://blogs.worldwatch.org/five-global-seed-banks-that-areprotecting-biodiversity/ [https://perma.cc/MJN5-3KRA] (describing conservation and education
efforts at major seed banks); Oliver A. Ryder et al., DNA Banks for Endangered Animal Species,
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tentially help mitigate unanticipated impacts of biotechnology products,
serving as an emergency backstop. 304
CONCLUSION
Advances in genetic engineering such as CRISPR give public and private actors the ability to edit the DNA of living organisms, including human
beings, with precision. Biotechnology governance in the United States is
not equipped to address the new generation of gene editing techniques. As
technological limits fall, policy choices will determine whether and how to
deploy gene editing techniques.
To the parties conducting gene editing experiments, the companies
seeking to commercialize a genetically-engineered organism, or a regulator
operating under the current legal regime, questions regarding the appropriate uses of gene editing techniques may appear as isolated issues that turn
on whether a proposed use presents specific, known risks. Considering the
questions through the narrow lens of a single application of gene editing
misses the full scope of the issues, however. These questions are about more
than risk management.
Moving beyond the product versus process distinction to more effectively balance competing interests requires a different conceptualization of
the genome, one that recognizes the range of conflicts inherent in the biotechnology debate. Here, the nation’s natural resource policies provide important lessons for implementing a heterogenous approach to resource exploitation and conservation, accommodating conflicting views, and creating
a corollary to protected areas by prohibiting or limiting certain biotechnology applications. Decisionmakers should look to these laws as models for
modernizing the system of biotechnology governance to consider a wider
scope of interests, concerns, and values.

288 SCI. 275, 275–77 (2000) (arguing for the implementation of DNA banks as a critical step to
preserve endangered animal species).
304
Phillip A. Morin et al., Preservation of DNA from Endangered Species, 289 SCI. 725, 725–
27 (2000).

